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Scholarship on international law has undergone an
empirical revolution. Throughout the revolution,
however, shortcomings of the observational data that
studies have used have posed serious barriers to reli-
able causal inference. During the same period, politi-
cal scientists and legal scholars studying domestic law
have increasingly employed experimental methods be-
cause they make it easier to make credible causal
claims. Despite the simultaneous emergence of those
trends, there have been relatively few attempts to use
experimental methods to study international law. This
should change. In this paper we present the first ar-
gument that the study of international law could
uniquely benefit from the use of experimental research
methods. To make this argument, we present data we
have collected that illustrates why observational stud-
ies will often be unable to provide answers to many of
the most important questions of legal scholars. After
doing so, we provide guidance on how laboratory,
survey, and field experiments can be used by legal
scholars to research international law.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, there has been an empirical revolution
in the study of international law.' During that time, the focus of in-
ternational legal scholarship has moved away from debating whether
international law matters and toward trying to explain when-and
why-states commit to and comply with international legal agree-
ments. 2 This "empirical turn" has produced important new scholar-
ship on a range of substantive areas of international law; 3 including
international human rights law, 4 the laws of war,5 and international
economic law.6
Throughout this empirical turn, however, scholars have strug-
gled to provide convincing evidence that international law has a
causal impact on state behavior.7 Although prominent commentators
1. See generally Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn In
International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2012) (documenting the growth of
empirical research of international law); see also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor
& Yonatan Lupu, Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field,
106 AM. J. INT'L L. 47 (2012) (proving a review of political science research that is relevant
to the study of international law); Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13
ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 273 (2010) (reviewing empirical research on treaty commitment and
compliance). Of course, it is important to note that during this time there has also been a rise
in the use of empirical legal research more generally. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond
& Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews, 6 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sa. 581,
589 (2010).
2. See Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at I ("What matters now [in research on
international law] is the study of the conditions under which international law is formed and
has effects.").
3. See id. at 19-42 (documenting empirical legal scholarship on five substantive
areas of international law).
4. For an overview of the current state of the quantitative literature on international
human rights, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, International Regimes for Human Rights, 15
ANN. REV. POL. Se. 265 (2012). For examples of prominent quantitative scholarship on
international human rights, see, e.g., BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
5. See, e.g., James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 559 (2007); Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth & Sarah Croco, Covenants
Without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War, 58
WORLD POL. 339 (2006).
6. See, e.g., CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, WHY ADJUDICATE? ENFORCING TRADE RULES IN
THE WTO (2012); Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 435 (2009).
7. For a general discussion of this issue, see Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley,
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initially simply proclaimed that rates of compliance with internation-
al law were high as evidence of international law's importance, 8 the
debate has shifted to whether international law actually has a causal
impact on changing state behavior. 9 This shift has been made in part
because of the recognition that-perhaps best expressed in Downs,
Rocke, and Barsoom's seminal article on the topic'o-states may
simply select only into international agreements that codify policies
that would have been adopted even in the absence of an international
agreement. Although researchers quickly began to respond to that
skeptical claim by producing scholarship that tried to demonstrate
that international law does in fact change state behavior," the empir-
ical methods used by a number of early prominent studies were criti-
cized for their inability to satisfactorily demonstrate that international
law has a causal influence on state behavior. 12 Although researchers
Daniel Nielson & J. C. Sharman, Does International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 743,
764-67 (2013). Of course, the struggle to improve causal inference is not unique to
international law. Efforts to analyze law more broadly have faced the same problems. For a
discussion of the history of causal analysis in legal studies, and advice on how to improve
research design to aid causal inference, see Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible
Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REv. L. Soc. Sci. 17 (2011); see also
Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1 (2002).
8. The most famous statement of this view was Louis Henkin's claim that "almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time." Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (1979). In addition to
Henkin's claim, another prominent expression of this view can be found in Chayes &
Chayes theory that has become known as the "managerial school" of international law. See
Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993)
(discussing explanations for why nations comply with their international legal
commitments).
9. See Eric A. Posner, Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons's "Mobilizing for
Human Rights", 44 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 819 (2012).
10. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About
Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996) (arguing that
evidence that states comply with international law is not evidence that states make
meaningful changes in policy as a consequence of international treaties and agreements).
11. See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment
and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 819 (2000);
Hathaway, supra note 4.
12. For a critical response to Simmons, supra note 11, see Jana von Stein, Do Treaties
Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 611
(2005) (arguing that Simmons did not adequately deal with selection effects that influence
which states agree to bind themselves with international agreements). But see Beth
Simmons & Daniel Hopkins, The Constraining Power ofInternational Treaties: Theory and
Methods, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 623 (2005) (responding to von Stein's criticisms); Shaffer
& Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that despite von Stein's arguments, "we believe that
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have begun to use more complicated empirical methods-like in-
strumental variable regression' 3 and matching 14-to demonstrate
causality, these approaches have not entirely silenced critics that are
skeptical of states' willingness to change their preferences and ac-
tions as a consequence of international law.15 As a result, improving
the empirical methods used to conduct causal analysis is a project
that is of great importance for scholars of international law.
While international law scholars have debated how to demon-
strate causation, political scientists have embraced experimental re-
search methods, 16 as have, increasingly, legal scholars studying other
areas of law.' 7 In the last two decades, experimental methods have
become a common research strategy used to study a range of topics:
from what strategies are most likely to turn people out to vote during
elections,' 8 to whether legislatures are biased against their constitu-
Simmons' contribution withstands the critique in this particular case . . ."). For a critical
response to Hathaway, supra note 4, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the
Effect of Human Rights Treaties, 15 Eu. J. INT'L L. 171 (2003) (arguing against a number of
empirical decisions and claims made by Hathaway).
13. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 4; Morrow, supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Yonatan Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty Commitments: Using
the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects, AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://dss.ucsd.edu/-ylupu/Informative%2OPower.pdf; Rich Nielsen & Beth
Simmons, Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human
Rights Regime? (2011) (working paper) (on file with author); Daniel W. Hill, Jr., Estimating
the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161 (2010); Joseph M.
Grieco, Christopher F. Gelpi & T. Camber Warren, When Preferences and Commitments
Collide: The Effect of Relative Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance, 63 INT'L
ORG. 341 (2009); Simmons & Hopkins, supra note 12.
15. See Posner, supra note 9 (expressing skepticism at the empirical approach used by
Simmons to argue that human rights treaties can change state policies through their potential
to alter domestic political calculations).
16. See generally James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski &
Arthur Lupia, The Growth and Development ofExperimental Research in Political Science,
100 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 627 (2006). For a longer discussion of the growing use of
experimental methods in political science, see infra Part I.A.
17. See Diamond & Mueller, supra note 1, at 589 (providing evidence of research
using experimental methods published in law reviews). For a longer discussion of the
growing use of experimental methods in legal scholarship, see infra Part I.B.
18. See generally DONALD P. GREEN & ALAN S. GERBER, GET OUT THE VOTE! How TO
INCREASE VOTER TURNOUT (2008) (explaining experimental research on how political
campaigns can increase voter turnout). For a recent example of this line of research, see
Daron R. Shaw, Donald P. Green, James G. Gimpel & Alan S. Gerber, Do Robotic Calls
from Credible Sources Influence Voter Turnout or Vote Choice? Evidence from a
Randomized Field Experiment, 11 J. POL. MARKETING 231 (2012).
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ents,19 to the "democratic peace" theory,20 to questions in constitu-
tional law. 2 1 This growth in experiments has been fueled by the in-
creasing ease of experimental research, 22 and the growing recognition
that experimental methods greatly facilitate credible causal claims. 23
Simply put, by using experimental methods, researchers are able to
control the data-generation process. That is, they can estimate the in-
fluence of a specific intervention on an outcome by randomly assign-
ing treatments.
Yet, despite the fact that empirical research on international
law has struggled to demonstrate causal claims, there have been few
efforts to use experimental methods to study international law. In
fact, we are aware of only a handful of international law experi-
ments 24-one field experiment, 25 two laboratory experiments, 26 and
19. See Daniel M. Butler & David E. Broockman, Do Politicians Racially
Discriminate against Constituents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators, 55 AM. J. POL.
Scl. 463 (2011) (providing evidence that legislators are less likely to help putatively black
constituents with requests for help voting).
20. See Michael Tomz & Jessica L. Weeks, The Democratic Peace: An Experimental
Approach, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4-5), available at
https://www.princeton.edu/-pcglobal/conferences/methods/papers/tomz.pdf.
21. For a recent example of legal research that used experimental methods, see Dan
M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman, Danieli Evans & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
"They Saw a Protest ": Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN.
L. REv. 851 (2012) (conducting a laboratory experiment to show that cultural outlooks affect
opinions on speech activities that are relevant to the speech-conduct distinction).
22. See, e.g., Druckman et al., supra note 16, at 629.
23. See, e.g., James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski & Arthur
Lupia, Experimentation in Political Science, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
POLITICAL SCIENCE 3, 3 (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski & Lupia, eds., 2011) ("The growing
interest in experimentation reflects the increasing value that the discipline places on causal
inference and empirically-guided theoretical refinement."); see also D. James Greiner,
Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 11 HARV. L. REV. 533, 558 (2008) ("[I]n causal
inference, a randomized experiment is the gold standard."). Cf Richard A. Berk, An
Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 386, 392 n.8
(1983) (arguing that randomized experiments are the best way to eliminate measurement and
specification errors). For a longer discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of different
methods of experimental research, see infra Part III.
24. It is important to note that we are referring specifically to papers that explicitly
conduct an experiment to test the effect of international laws-that is either treaty or
customary international law. There are also a number of papers that use experimental
methods to analyze the impact that international institutions have on public opinion. See,
e.g., Dustin Tingley & Michael Tomz, How Does the UN Security Council Influence Public
Opinion (2012) (working paper) (on file with author) (conducting an experiment to test the
mechanisms for how the United Nations Security Council may impact public opinion);
TERRANCE L. CHAPMAN, SECURING APPROVAL: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND MULTILATERAL
178 [52: 173
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eight survey experiments. 27 Moreover, political scientists, and not
AUTHORIZATION FOR WAR 121-30 (2011) (testing whether information on bias in the U.N.
Security Council influences the effect that its decisions have on public opinion); Joseph
Greico, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler & Peter D. Feaver, Let's Get a Second Opinion:
International Institutions and American Public Support for War, 55 INT'L S. Q. 563 (2011);
Daniel Maliank & Michael J. Tierney, Do Foreign Public Really Care About IO Approval?
(2009) (working paper), available at http://147.142.190.246/joomla/peio/files/Maliank
Tierney.pdf.
25. Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson & J. C. Sharman, Using Field Experiments
in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation, INT'L ORG.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://scholar.byu.edu/danielnielson/files/findley_eLal.
2013.experiments inir.25mayl3.pdf. The results of the same field experiment were
published in a law review article. See Baradaran et al., supra note 7; see also MICHAEL G.
FINDLEY, DANIEL L. NIELSON & JASON SHARMAN, GLOBAL SHELL GAMES: EXPERIMENTS ON
ANONYMOUS INCORPORATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS (forthcoming 2014).
26. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Brad L. Leveck, David G. Victor & James H.
Fowler, A Behavioral Approach to International Cooperation (ILAR Working Paper No. 13,
2012), available at http://ilar.ucsd.edu/assets/001/503027.pdf (conducting an experiment on
students and elites to analyze how individual traits may effect treaty negotiation);
Christopher Engel, The Emergence of a New Rule of Customary Law: An Experimental
Contribution, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 767 (2011) (conducting a laboratory experiment to provide
evidence that customary international law develops because practice leads to convergent
expectations).
27. See Dustin Tingley & Mike Tomz, Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change,
COMP. POL. STUD. (forthcoming 2014) (conducting a survey experiment that tests whether
respondents are more supportive of retaliatory measures being taken against countries that
have promised to reduce fossil fuel omissions compared to countries that said it would do
so); Stephen Chaudoin, Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International
Agreements and Audience Reactions, INT'L ORG. (forthcoming 2014) (conducting an
experiment to illustrate how respondents with expressed preferences have muted reactions
when they learn that leaders have broken international agreements on trade policy); Adam
Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An
Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2014) (conducting a survey experiment
examining the influence of information on international human rights agreements on public
opinion); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Towards Torture:
An Experimental Study, 67 INT'L ORG. 105 (2013) (conducting a survey experiment to
determine if the degree of legalization of international law affects public opinion on torture);
Adam Chilton, Public Opinion, the Laws of War, & Saving Civilians: An Experimental
Study (2013) (working paper) (on file with author) (conducting a survey experiment to
analyze whether information on the status of international law changes public opinion on the
acceptability of targeting civilians during war); Emilie Marie Hafnier-Burton, Brad L.
LeVeck & David G. Victor, Strategic Enforcement: Results from an Elite Survey Experiment
on International Trade Agreements (ILAR Working Paper No. 16 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2132948 (conducting a survey
experiment on elites to show that strategic qualities of individuals explain preferences for the
designs of the enforcement provision of trade agreements); Tonya L. Putnam & Jacob N.
Shapiro, International Law and Voter Preferences: The Case of Foreign Human Rights
Violations (2013) (working paper) (on file with author) (conducting a survey experiment to
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legal scholars, conducted all of these experiments. 28
This trend should change. In this paper, we argue that inter-
national law is a field that could uniquely benefit from experimental
research. This is not only because international law is a field that is
particularly concerned with causal analysis, but also because there
are a number of limitations of observational data on international law
that severely restrict the ability of observational studies to produce
credible causal inferences on many of the topic's most important
questions. To make this argument, we articulate a set of general
points about observational data in international law and supplement
these points with data on international legal agreements. As we will
illustrate, using this data and a range of prominent examples from the
literature, experimental methods provide a promising way forward to
study international law, either in concert with other methods or in
places where other methods may be unable to do so.
At the outset, we should note that experimental methods are
not a panacea. Our argument is not that observational studies are
never valuable, or that experimental methods are always preferable:
there are limitations to experimental methods29 and designing valid
experiments can be a difficult task requiring careful research on ex-
perimental methods and procedures. Our argument is, however, that
experimental methods are frequently the most credible way to test
causal relationships and that many limitations with the observational
analyze whether views on the use of sanctions to punish foreign human rights abuses change
as a result of respondents being provided information on the status of international law);
Michael Tomz, Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs
(Working Paper No. 24, 2008), available at http://www.stanford.edu/-tomz/working/Tomz-
IntlLaw-2008-02-11a.pdf (conducting experiments to determine if information on
international law changes perceptions of elites and individuals through a survey experiment).
It is worth noting that Tomz's paper, written in 2008, was the "first-ever experimental
analysis of treaty commitments." Id. at 1.
28. The one exception that we are currently aware of is Shima Baradaran, Associate
Professor of Law, BYU Law School. Baradaran was a coauthor with political scientists on
an article using a field experiment examining compliance with international law. See
Baradaran et al., supra note 7. Another exception worth mentioning is Katerina Linos,
Assistant Professor of Law, UC Berkley School of Law. Linos teaches and writes in
international law and has a book and a number of articles using experimental methods. To
our knowledge, however, Linos' research using experimental methods has focused on policy
diffusion across the OECD. See, e.g., KATERINA LINOs, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF
POLICY DIFFUSION: How HEALTH, FAMILY, AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS
COUNTRIES (2013).
29. For example, one difficulty with experimental research is designing an experiment
that will produce externally valid results. For more on this point, see infra notes 242-44 and
accompanying text.
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data available to study questions important in international law would
benefit greatly from their use.
To make the argument that experiments should be used to
study international law, we begin in Part I by offering important
background on the use of experimental methods in both political sci-
ence and legal scholarship. We first explore the recent growth in ex-
perimental research in political science, including its increasing use
to study international relations. We next document the increasing ac-
ceptance and use of experimental methods by legal scholars in a
range of fields, and then discuss how this trend has not extended to
international law.
In Part II, we use examples and data to show that there are as-
pects of international law that make experimental methods a particu-
larly well-suited approach to studying many important questions in
the field. First, we argue that in many cases, the widespread adoption
of treaties and universal applicability of customary international law
mean that there is often insufficient variance in the "treatment" of
international law for observational studies to be appropriate. Exper-
imental methods can address these problems by employing research
designs that randomize the information on the applicability of inter-
national law. Second, we argue that there is often a short window
during which there is sufficient variation in the adoption of interna-
tional agreements to allow for observational studies, but that experi-
mental research allows for studying phenomena outside of such a
narrow time frame. Third, we argue that observational studies are
frequently unable to deal with the fact that many states have overlap-
ping legal constraints created by the presence of domestic laws and
international treaties covering the same issue areas. This collinearity
poses serious inference problems for observational studies, but can
easily be overcome by using designs that randomize the laws dis-
cussed in experimental vignettes. Fourth, we argue that observation-
al studies have had difficulty finding appropriate dependent variables
to measure whether states comply with international agreements.
Experimental research can overcome this obstacle by using research
designs that directly measure theories of why international law might
change a state's policies and actions. Finally, we conclude this Part
by arguing that experimental research can help overcome the most
widely discussed inferential barrier to the study of international
law-selection bias.
After making the case for why experimental research is need-
ed, in Part III of the paper, we turn to specifically discussing how in-
ternational legal scholars can conduct experimental research. To do
so, we discuss each of three experimental methods in turn: laborato-
2013] 181
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ry experiments, survey experiments, and field experiments. 30 For
each, we provide an explanation of the virtues and vices of the meth-
od, provide examples of cutting edge research using the approach,
and discuss how it might be applied to research on important topics
in international law.
I. THE GROWTH OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
The use of experimental methods in political and legal re-
search has increased dramatically in the last two decades. 31 Today,
improvements in technology mean that researchers can easily, cheap-
ly, and quickly design and administer experiments to thousands of
subjects. 32 Researchers can now design their experiments in ways
that directly test hypothetical theoretical causal mechanisms in ways
that were previously difficult, if not impossible, with observational
studies alone. 33 We argue scholars of international law should use
experimental methods not only because these developments can
make possible directly testing the plausibility of their theories, but al-
so because observational methods are often particularly poor ways to
study international law. We will begin, in this Part, by providing
general background on the growth of experimental methods.
This Part will proceed in two sections. We will first docu-
ment the growth of experimental research in political science, as well
as its recent popularity as a method of studying international rela-
tions. We will then discuss how legal scholars have begun to em-
brace experimental research, but that this embrace has not extended
30. A fourth category of research that can also be considered experimental is natural
experiments. Although we will not consider natural experiments in depth, they are a
growing research strategy used by legal scholars and political scientists that present a
promising research method in many cases. For more information, see infra notes 238-40
and accompanying text.
31. See generally Druckman et al., supra note 16. See infra notes 34-48, 67-80, and
accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating
Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon. com's Mechanical Turk, 20 POL.
ANAL. 351 (2012). We will provide guidance on how to conduct experiments-including
online experiments-in Part III.
33. See generally Kosuke Imai, Dustin Tingley & Teppei Yamamoto, Experimental
Designs for Identifying Causal Mechanisms, 176 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y 5 (2013). See also
Kosuke Imai, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley & Teppei Yamamoto, Unpacking the Black Box of
Causality: Learning About Causal Mechanisms from Experiments and Observational
Studies, 105 AM. POL. Sa. REv. 765 (2011). For a longer discussion about designing
experiments to test causal mechanisms, see infra Part III.B.
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to international law. As we will discuss, legal scholars studying in-
ternational law generally do not use experimental methods. This dis-
cussion will help lay the foundation for our argument in Part II that
international law could benefit from experimental research.
A. The Growth ofExperiments in Political Science
Research on the value of randomization for causal inference,
and thus the theoretical underpinnings of modern experimental re-
search, first began to emerge in the 1920s. 34 Despite this early re-
search on the value of experiments, social scientists generally were
slow to adopt experimental methods.35 In fact, economics and politi-
cal science were both disciplines where very little experimental re-
search was published in the fifty years after the first work on the im-
portance of randomization. 36 The first experiment was not published
in the American Political Science Review (APSR)--the leading polit-
ical science journal-until 1956.37 This was not a watershed mo-
ment: it took over a decade for the next experiment to appear in the
APSR.38 Moreover, commentators have suggested that the use of
experimental methods was poorly regarded by the discipline until re-
cently. 39
34. Ho & Rubin, supra note 7, at 18 (citing R.A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR
RESEARCH WORKERS (1925); R.A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (1935)); see also
Druckman et al., supra note 23, at 4 ("While scientists have conducted experiments for
hundreds of years, modern experimentation made its debut in the 1920s and 1930s.").
35. See Armin Falk & James J. Heckman, Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of
Knowledge in the Social Sciences, 326 SCIENCE 535, 535 (2009) ("The social sciences have
generally been less willing to use laboratory experiments than the natural sciences, and
empirical social science has traditionally been considered as largely non-experimental, that
is, based on observations collected in naturally occurring situations.").
36. For evidence on the limited use of experiments by economists before the 1970s,
see id. at 535 ("Fewer than 10 experimental papers [in economics] per year were published
before 1965, which grew to about 30 per year by 1975."). For a discussion on the growth of
the use of experimental methods in political science, see REBECCA B. MORTON & KENNETH
C. WILLIAMS, EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE STUDY OF CAUSALITY: FROM
NATURE TO THE LAB 3-10 (2010); Kathleen McGraw & Valerie Hoekstra, Experimentation
in Political Science: Historical Trends and Future Directions, in RESEARCH IN
MICROPOLITICs 3 (1994); Druckman et al., supra note 16, at 628-30.
37. See Druckman et al., supra note 16, at 628-29. The first experiment was a study
by Samuel Eldersveld that encouraged participants to vote based on personal contact. See
Samuel J. Eldersveld, Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior, 50 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 154 (1956).
38. See Druckman et al., supra note 16, at 629.
39. See MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 3 ("Until the last decade,
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In recent years, however, experimental methods have become
widely used in political science. Although there is a debate on the
exact number of published articles using experimental research
methods,40 there is agreement that the number has grown exponen-
tially in the last two decades. 41 In fact, there were over fifty experi-
mental articles published in just three political science journals be-
tween 2000 and 2007.42 Although perhaps the most prominent
experiments published in the last decade have focused on voter turn-
out, 43 experimental methods have been used to study a range of top-
ics: from how individual attitudes towards immigration policy are
formed,44 to the circumstances under which incorporating private
firms comply with international disclosure requirement laws. 45 Addi-
tionally, political scientists have held conferences dedicated solely to
experimental research, 46 formed a section of the American Political
experimentation seemed to have a low standing within the discipline."); see also Druckman
et al., supra note 16, at 627 ("[Pjolitical scientists have long expressed skepticism about the
prospects for experimental science.").
40. See MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 3 (citing Rose McDermott,
Experimental Methods in Political Science, 5 ANN. REv. POL. Sci. 32 (2002) (discussing a
disagreement over how to correctly classify which articles should be counted as
experimental political science)).
41. See id. at 4-5. See also Druckman et al., supra note 16, at 628.
42. See MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 4.
43. See, e.g., Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green & Christopher W. Larimer, Social
Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence From a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL.
SCI. REv. 33 (2008) (conducting a large field experiment to show that voters are more likely
to vote after receiving letters that apply social pressure encouraging them to vote); see also
GREEN & GERBER, supra note 18; Shaw et al., supra note 18.
44. See, e.g., Dustin Tingley, Public Finance and Immigration Preferences: A Lost
Connection?, 45 POLITY 4 (2013) (using experimental evidence to produce evidence that
individual immigration preferences are not driven by states' public finances environments);
see also Jens Hainmueller & Michael J. Hiscox, Attitudes Toward Highly Skilled and Low-
Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 61 (2010)
(conducting an experiment to produce evidence that nonmaterial factors explain individual
immigration preferences).
45. See Findley et al., supra note 25 (conducting a field experiment to test whether
information on the status of international law changes private firms' likelihood to comply
with international disclosure requirements in response to requests to incorporate); see also
Baradaran et al., supra note 7 (reporting the results of the same experiments).
46. For example, the New York University Center for Experimental Social Science
(NYU - CESS) held its fifth annual conference in March 2012. For more information, see
NYU CESS 5TH ANNUAL EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE CONFERENCE http://cess.
nyu.edu/policon20l2/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). Additionally, Brigham Young University
held a "Field Experiments in International Relations" Conference in September 2012. See
FIELD EXPERIMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, https://pedl.byu.edu/Pages/
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Science Association dedicated to experimental research, 47 and even
established a regular newsletter on experimental political science. 48
What should be of interest to scholars of international law,
however, is that experimental methods have not only been used to
study American politics, 4 9 but also have increasingly been used to
study international relations.50 For example, laboratory experiments
have been used to study how personality traits and incentives affect
policy on topics ranging from the distribution of foreign aid to the
conduct of war,51 survey experiments have been used to understand
how audience costs change political decision-making, 52 and field ex-
periments have helped illuminate how international organizations
should improve resource allocation.53 Although experimental re-
Conference.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2013), for more information.
47. The "Experimental Research" section of the American Political Science
Association was organized in 2010. See Organized Section: 42. Experimental Research,
AM. POL. Sci. Ass'N, https://www.apsanet.org/sections/sectionDetail.cfm?section=Sec42
(last visited Jan. 17, 2013), for more information.
48. Established in 2010, the "Experimental Political Scientist" is the American
Political Science Association's bi-annual newsletter. It is edited by Dustin Tingley and
contains advice on new methods for conducting experimental research and surveys of recent
research. For the complete archive, see EXPPOLIScI, http://scholar.harvard.edu/dtingley/
pages/exppolisci (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
49. Rose McDermott, New Directions for Experimental Work in International
Relations, 55 INT'L STUD. Q. 503, 503 (2011) ("Experimentation has infiltrated some aspects
of political science, most notably in the realms of public opinion and voting behavior and
economic gains in comparative perspective. . .") (citations omitted).
50. For articles reviewing the use of experimental methods to study international
relations, see Alex Mintz, Yi Yang & Rose McDermott, Experimental Approaches to
International Relations, 55 INT'L STUD. Q. 493 (2011); McDermott, supra note 49; Natalie
Florea Hudson & Michael J. Butler, The State of Experimental Research in IR: An Analytic
Study, 12 INT'L STUD. REv. 165 (2010).
51. See Dustin Tingley, The Dark Side of the Future: An Experimental Test of
Commitment Problems in Bargaining, 55 INT'L STUD. Q. 521 (2011); Joshua Kertzer, Taking
Resolve Seriously: Three Theories of Willpower in International Politics (Mar. 16, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
52. See, e.g., Michael Tomz, Domestic Audience Cost in International Relations: An
Experimental Approach, 61 INT'L ORG. 821 (2007).
53. See Susan D. Hyde, Experimenting in Democracy Promotion: International
Observers and the 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia, 8 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 511
(2010); Jeremy M. Weinstein & James D. Fearon, Can Development Aid Contribute to
Social Cohesion After Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict
Liberia, 99 AM. EcON. REV. 287 (2009); Mary Kay Gugerty & Michael Kremer, Outside
Funding and the Dynamics of Participation in Community Associations, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI.
585 (2008).
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search is admittedly far from being the primary method used to study
international affairs, 54 this growing body of research shows that con-
ducting experiments is an incredibly valuable way to gain insight into
international relations.5 5 Experiments do not just compliment obser-
vational research methods; they also provide insight into important
questions that have been at a standstill because of inferential prob-
lems with observational data. 56
The increase in the use of experimental methods in both polit-
ical science generally and international relations specifically has been
driven by several factors.57 First, as previously noted,58 experimental
methods make it possible to make credible causal claims when it is
frequently difficult to do so with observational data: 59 by randomly
assigning when a specific intervention is given without varying any
other factors, it is possible to reliably estimate the influence of that
intervention on a given outcome. For example, to test whether a par-
ticular drug helps treat a disease, medical researchers randomly as-
sign a group of patients to receive the drug while other patients re-
ceive a placebo or no treatment at all. If the group that received the
drug sees its condition change relative to the group that did not, re-
searchers can assume that the drug caused the difference. Similarly,
political scientists are able to analyze whether international election
monitors influence voting results by randomly selecting polling sta-
54. See McDermott, supra note 49, at 503.
55. For example, there is a large body of experimental research trying to understand
international security. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER GELPI, PETER FEAVER & JASON A. REIFLER,
PAYING THE HUMAN COSTS OF WAR: AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND CASUALTIES IN
MILITARY CONFLICTS (2009); ADAM J. BERINSKY, IN TIME OF WAR: UNDERSTANDING
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION FROM WORLD WAR II TO IRAQ (2009); Matthew S. Levendusky
& Michael C. Horowitz, When Backing Down is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New
Information, and Audience Costs, 74 J. POL. 323 (2012); Michael C. Horowitz & Matthew S.
Levendusky, Drafting Support for War: Conscription and Mass Support for Warfare, 73 J.
POL. 524 (2011); Robert F. Trager & Lynn Vavreck, The Political Costs of Crisis
Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 526 (2011);
Matthew A. Baum & Tim Groeling, Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public
Opinion Regarding National Security and War, 31 POL. BEHAV. 157 (2009); Scott Sigmund
Gartner, The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental
Approach, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 95 (2008).
56. See, e.g., Tomz & Weeks, supra note 20 (discussing why a number of problems
with observational data have made it impossible to provide a satisfactory test of the
democratic peace hypothesis).
57. See generally MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 12-16.
58. See supra note 23.
59. See generally MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 12-14; see also Druckman
et al., supra note 16, at 627.
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tions with monitors present during an election.60
Secondly, technological improvements have made it easier to
conduct experimental research. 61 For example, prominent commen-
tators have in part attributed the rise in political scientists' experi-
mental research to the development of computer-assisted telephone
interviews in the 1990s. 62 The Internet has made it possible to con-
duct experiments cheaply, 63 also giving rise to a new wave of exper-
imental research. 64 The result of these and other 65 technological de-
velopments means that, as political scientists are increasingly
recognizing the value of experiments, it is becoming easier than ever
to incorporate them into their research.
B. The Growth ofExperiments in Legal Research
The same factors that have led political scientists to increas-
ingly conduct experimental research have also begun to influence le-
gal scholars. 66 Unsurprisingly, however, legal researchers have been
slower to fully adopt experimental research methods.67 The first
wave of empirical legal studies took shape in the 1920s and 1930s, 68
which was roughly the same time when the theoretical foundations
for modem experimental research were developed. 69 Despite these
early roots, empirical legal research was still rare for much of the
60. See Hyde, supra note 53.
61. See also Druckman et al., supra note 16, at 629-30. But see MORTON &
WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 12 (arguing that although technological advances have made it
easier to conduct experimental research, "technology cannot be the primary answer for why
experiments have increased in standing").
62. See Druckman et al., supra note 16, at 629-30.
63. Cf Berinsky et al., supra note 32 (demonstrating how Amazon's "Mechanical
Turk" service can be used to conduct reliable social scientific experiments).
64. See, e.g., Tingley & Tomz, supra note 27.
65. For example, easy to use computer software that can help analyze survey results.
66. Cf., e.g., Greener, supra note 23, at 558.
67. For an excellent primer on the use and misuse of empirical methods by legal
scholars generally, see Epstein & King, supra note 7.
68. For a fascinating discussion of early legal empirical research, see Ho & Rubin,
supra note 7, at 18-19 (citing JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995)); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, The (Nearly) Forgotten
Early Empirical Legal Research, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH
875 (P. Cane & H.M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
69. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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twentieth century, 70 and the use of experimental methods was even
rarer still. Perhaps the earliest appreciation for experimental methods
came from the law and economics movement.7' That said, the par-
ticular recognition of the value of experiments focused on explaining
the insights legal scholars could gain from laboratory experiments
conducted by economists; the actual examples of legal researchers
conducting experiments on their own were few and far between. 72
In the last twenty years, however, this trend has begun to
change. 73 Leading law journals have published articles involving la-
boratory experiments, 74 survey experiments,75 field experiments, 76
70. Cf Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Introduction to the Symposium on
Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 791, 791 (2003)
("Empirical methods are still rare in legal scholarship: very few law professors buttress their
arguments by appeals to tests of statistical significance or even with descriptive statistics.").
McAdams & Ulen do, however, suggest that empirical and experimental methods are
becoming more common in legal scholarship. See id. (citing Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in
Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (2000)).
71. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics:
An Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 991 (1985). For more recent examples of law and
economics scholarship on the value of experiments, see Rachel Croson, Experimental Law
and Economics, 5 ANN. REv. L. Soc. Sci. 25 (2009); Rachel Croson, Why and How to
Experiment: Methodologies from Experimental Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 921 (2003).
72. Cf Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 71, at 1024 n. 110 (documenting the exceptions
to their observation that "[mluch of the research discussed [in their article] was neither done
by legal scholars nor designed specifically to test or investigate theories of law and
economics").
73. See McAdams & Ulen, supra note 70, at 791-92 (discussing the rise of legal
scholars using empirical methods generally); cf Ho & Rubin, supra note 7, at 20
(documenting experimental studies relevant to law, with the earliest published in 1990);
Diamond & Mueller, supra note 1, at 590-92 (documenting the use of empirical research in
law reviews, including experimental methods).
74. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Christine L. Porath & Samuel N. Fraidin,
Brandeis' Policeman: Results From a Laboratory Experiment on How to Prevent Corporate
Fraud, 5 J. EMPiRICAL LEGAL STuD. 239 (2008); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Group
Deliberation and the Endowment Effect: An Experimental Study, 50 Hous. L. REv. 41
(2012).
75. See, e.g., David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash?
Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 731 (2012); David A. Hoffman
& Alexander S. Radus, Instructing Juries on Noneconomic Contract Damages, 81 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1221 (2012).
76. See, e.g., David Schakade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What Happened on
Deliberation Day?, 95 CAL. L. REv. 915 (2007); see also D. James Greiner, Cassandra
Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance
Programs? A Randomized Experiment in a Massachusetts Housing Court (2012) (working
paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-1880078 (last
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and even natural experiments."7 In these articles, experimental meth-
ods have helped to answer important questions from a range of legal
fields, including criminal law,7 8 constitutional law, 79 and corporate
law,80 among others. It appears that experimental methods are gain-
ing mainstream acceptance as a credible research method for legal
scholars.
While experimental methods have begun to permeate law
generally, largely because of their superiority over observational
methods in evaluating causality, this has not yet occurred in the field
of international law.8 ' In fact, as far as we can tell, legal scholars
studying international law have essentially not used experimental
methods at all. 82 For example, in Shaffer and Ginsburg's recent ex-
tensive review of empirical scholarship on international law, they do
not discuss a single experiment. 83 Moreover, we have been unable to
find any original experimental research published in an international
law journal. As far as we can tell, the experimental work on interna-
tional law that has been conducted has been done entirely by profes-
sors in political science departments that are interested in internation-
al relations and international legal issues.84 Given the growing use of
visited Jan. 15, 2013); Carol Seron, Martin Frankel, Gregg Van Ryzin & Kean Kovath, The
Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City's Housing Court:
Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 419 (2001); Ian Ayres, Fair
Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV.
817 (1991).
77. See, e.g., Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (2011);
Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Timing of Elections, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 37
(2010); see also David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random
Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1145 (2007).
78. See Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really
Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOzO L.
REv. 1719 (2002); see also Gary S. Green, General Deterrence and Television Cable Crime:
A Field Experiment in Social Control, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 629 (1985). See generally
CHRISTINE HORNE & MICHAEL LOVAGLIA, EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES IN LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY (2008).
79. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 21 (using experimental methods to explore the
First Amendment speech/conduct distinction).
80. See, e.g., Guttentag et al., supra note 74; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen &
Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment, HARV. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER No. 697 (2011).
81. But see supra note 25 (documenting recent studies that use experimental methods
to examine questions relevant to the study of international law).
82. But see supra note 28.
83. See Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1.
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empirical methods to study international law8 5 and the problems of
inference that have led many to criticize observational studies in the
field,86 it is time that this changes.
II. WHY EXPERIMENTS ARE NEEDED FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
As the previous section demonstrated, experimental methods
are an increasingly common way for scholars to conduct research on
political and legal issues, and the ability of experiments to provide
reliable causal estimates is a considerable advantage to using these
methods when studying international events. That said, we are una-
ware of any attempts to argue that experimental methods are uniquely
appropriate for the study of international law. In fact, the justifica-
tions for using experimental methods in international law run deeper
than those for using experimental methods in international relations
more generally. The ratification patterns and complexity of interna-
tional agreements mean that international law is particularly well
suited to experimental methods. Accordingly, although there have
been considerable advances in the understanding of the effects of in-
ternational law using observational research designs, 87 this discussion
will demonstrate further why these approaches should be augmented
by experimental research.
In this Part, we present five arguments for why experimental
methods are particularly appropriate for studying international law.
First, we argue that there is frequently insufficient variation in the
countries that are bound by sources of international law-specifically
multinational treaties and customary law-to assess whether those
laws change country behavior. This makes experimental methods an
appropriate and cost-efficient way to create that variation by random-
izing input information on whether states are bound by international
law. Second, we present evidence that there are frequently short
windows of time when there is variance in treaty adoption, meaning
there may be too few events that occur during that time frame to al-
low for a reliable study. Given these realities, we explain how exper-
84. See, e.g., Findley et al., supra note 25; Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 26;
Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 27; Tomz, supra note 27; Wallace, supra note 27.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 7-15.
87. For the most extensive effort to use sophisticated statistical methods to test
international law, see SIMMONS, supra note 4. For a summary of empirical findings from
using empirical efforts to study international law, see Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1;
Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 1; Simmons, supra note 1.
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imental methods present a way to explore hypothetical events outside
of the narrow windows available to observational studies. Third, we
explain how observational studies frequently do not account for over-
lapping legal constraints and thus cannot isolate the causal effects of
individual agreements on states. We suggest that experimental meth-
ods can help address this by testing whether international agreements
may have an "additive," rather than a purely "substitutive," effect
over other sources of law. Fourth, we discuss how observational
studies often have difficulty finding appropriate dependent variables
to test state compliance. We argue that experiments can be designed
in ways to directly test whether state and non-state actors comply,
thus overcoming the problems of using large datasets that are poor
direct measures of non-compliant behavior. Fifth, we argue that alt-
hough observational studies have problems accounting for the fact
that states do not randomly commit to international treaties or decide
to bring international litigation, experimental research can help over-
come the selection bias in these situations.
A. Lack of Variance in Sources ofInternational Law
A fundamental requirement of causal analysis is that any ex-
planatory variable must actually vary to assess its causal impact.88 If
an explanatory variable does not take on multiple values, it is impos-
sible to isolate the effect of that variable when compared to other fac-
tors that could influence a particular outcome. This requirement of-
ten poses difficulties for qualitative and quantitative researchers who
would like to study any fixed feature of an environment. 89 Experi-
mental research, however, allows researchers to artificially create the
variance required to study a given topic. 90
The need for explanatory variables to vary presents a particu-
lar challenge for any observational study analyzing the influence of
88. GARY KING, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY
146 (1994) ("[T]he causal effect of an explanatory variable that does not vary cannot be
assessed.").
89. See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A THEORETICAL
ANALYSIS 16-41 (1959) (arguing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the influence
of human nature on war because if human nature is fixed, it is not possible to use it as a
variable to explain instances of war and peace); see also KING, KEOHANE & VERBA, supra
note 88, at 147 (citing DAVID D. LAITIN, HEGEMONY AND CULTURE: POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS
CHANGE AMONG THE YORUBA (1986)) (noting Laitin's difficulty in studying the influence of
religion on politics in Somalia because of the religious homogeneity among the population).
90. For example, this can be done by varying information on whether particular
countries have ratified a given treaty. See, e.g., Tomz, supra note 27.
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international law on state behavior: the two primary sources of inter-
national law, treaties and customary international law, 91 often do not
have sufficient variance to allow for a satisfactory analysis of their
causal impact. It is possible, however, to overcome these problems
using experimental methods.
1. Widespread Ratification of Multinational Treaties
It is increasingly difficult to assess the influence of many of
the most important multinational treaties because they have become
so widely adopted. As we will discuss, experimental methods, by
varying the information provided to research subjects on whether or
not a given country has ratified a treaty, can help with this roadblock
in international law study.
One of the most prominent lines of empirical research in in-
ternational law has been examining whether the ratification of trea-
ties influences the behavior of states. 92 This line of research has used
treaty ratification as the key explanatory variable in a wide range of
substantive issue areas in international law. 93 This includes research
on compliance with international monetary rules, 94 environmental
standards, 95 human rights, 96 and the laws of war,97 among others. 98
The difficulty, however, is that many of the most important treaties
have become so ubiquitous that there is very little variance in their
91. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom,
120 YALE L.J. 202, 204 (2010) ("There are two basic types of international law-treaties
and customary international law (CIL).").
92. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 1, at 274; see also Hafner-Burton et al., supra note
1, at 89 ("Research on whether an international legal agreement has had an effect on state
behavior often probes whether state parties comply with the terms of agreements more often
than nonparties.").
93. See generally Simmons, supra note 1, at 280-92 (reviewing empirical research on
treaty compliance by issue area).
94. See Simmons, supra note 11; see also von Stein, supra note 12; Simmons &
Hopkins, supra note 12.
95. See, e.g., Oran A. Young & Michael Zilrn, The International Regimes Database:
Designing and Using a Sophisticated Tool for Institutional Analysis, 6 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL.
121 (2006).
96. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 4; Hathaway, supra note 4.
97. See, e.g., Morrow, supra note 5; Valentino et al., supra note 5.
98. For example, there is a growing literature on the effect of ratification of Bilateral
Investment Treaties. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons,
Competing for Capital: The Dijfusion ofBilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L
ORG. 811 (2006).
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ratification. Moreover, since many studies have argued that treaties
likely have the largest influence on certain types of countries, 99 there
may be even less variance among this subset. Given the insufficient
variance in states that have ratified major agreements, using observa-
tional studies is a less viable option for studying the influence of trea-
ty ratification on state behavior. 00
Figure 1: Number of Parties to the Six
Major Human Rights Agreements
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To help illustrate this point, Figure 1 and Figure 2 present da-
ta on the number of states party to two categories of multilateral trea-
ties.101 Figure 1 presents the number of states party to the six "core"
99. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 150-54 (arguing that human rights treaties
have the largest impact on "Transnational/Partly Democratic Countries"); Morrow, supra
note 5, at 561 (arguing that democracies are more likely to comply with treaties on the laws
of war).
100. To be clear, there are sources of variation that can be exploited for observational
studies, such as the examination of the time period before treaties have been widely ratified
and the comparison of individual countries' behaviors before and after ratification. Our
broader point, however, is that experimental methods can introduce variation that is
otherwise not present in observational data.
101. The source for the data presented in Figure 1 is from the United Nations Treaty
Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited
Nov. 17, 2012). Figure 2 additionally contains data from the International Committee of the
Red Cross, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/
geneva-conventions/indexjsp (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). The data presented in Figures 1
& 2 are based on the number of state parties to these agreements as of Nov. 16, 2012.
--
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human rights treaties: 102 the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR);103 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);104 the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD); 0 5 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW);10 6 the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment (CAT); 107 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC). 0 8 Figure 2 presents the number of states party to the major
multinational conventions that have sought to regulate crimes against
humanity and armed conflicts post WWII: the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; 109 the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (Geneva Conventions I-IV);l0 Additional Pro-
102. See SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 59-64 (discussing the six "core" human rights
treaties being the ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, CRC, and CAT). See also
International Instruments, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR H.R., available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disability/Pages/Instruments.aspx (last visited Nov. 17,
2012) (providing information on the "six core human rights conventions").
103. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
104. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
105. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc.
A/6014, at 47 (Dec. 21, 1965), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
106. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (Dec.
18, 1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
107. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at
197 (Dec. 10, 1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
108. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 at 167 (Nov. 20, 1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Sept. 2, 1990).
109. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A.
Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951).
110. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct.
21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention
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tocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I); 111 and Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP II). 112 As Fig-
ures 1 & 2 show, the number of parties to these agreements ranges
from 154 to 195 states. To put this in perspective, with the addition
of South Sudan in 2011, there were 193 members of the United Na-
tions. 113 Thus, an overwhelming number of states are party to the
most important treaties regulating human rights and armed conflicts.
This leaves little variance in ratification for scholars seeking to assess
the impact of these agreements using traditional observational stud-
ies. 114
Figure 2: Number of Parties to Treaties
Governing Armed Conflicts
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Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
111. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol 1), Jun. 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
112. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II), Jun. 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
113. United Nations Member States-Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-
present, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited November 17,
2012). The Cook Islands are the only country that has signed the Geneva Conventions but is
not a member of the United Nations.
114. Of course it is still possible to gain some leverage by studying the effects of these
treaties during windows before ratification was so prevalent. For a discussion of this
approach, see infra Part II.B. .
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Although the lack of variance in the ratification of major mul-
tilateral treaties poses a serious obstacle for observational studies,
experimental research is able to help solve this problem. It is possi-
ble to employ an experimental design that randomizes whether coun-
tries are subject to a given treaty to try to estimate the impact that
agreement might have on individual preferences or predictions. For
example, Michael Tomz of Stanford University has conducted an ex-
periment on members of the British House of Commons to determine
"the impact of treaties on expectations."115 During interviews with
these policy makers, Tomz asked for their opinions on whether a
country in a hypothetical scenario was pursuing the development of
nuclear weapons. Half of the respondents were presented with a se-
ries of facts that included that the country in question had signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The other respondents re-
ceived an identical set of facts, but were told that the country had not
signed the NPT. 35% of the NPT-signed respondents thought it was
likely that the country was pursuing a nuclear weapon, but of those
told the country had not signed the NPT, 61% thought this pursuit
was likely.' 16 Although this is not proof that the NPT is having an
impact, it is at least evidence that high-level policy makers believe it
is an important signal. Moreover, since there are 190 countries cur-
rently party to the NPT,117 it is nearly impossible to try and estimate
whether the NPT has any influence without taking this kind of crea-
tive approach, made possible by experimental research design.
2. Universal Applicability of Customary International Law
Experimental methods also provide a way to deal with a relat-
ed and perhaps more difficult to account for problem: there is essen-
tially no variance in the applicability of Customary International Law
(CIL) because it applies to (almost) every country. Experiments help
deal with this by comparing reactions to specific treaty obligations to
the reactions to similar obligations simply grounded in general prin-
ciples of international law.
CIL is universally applicable international law, regardless of
whether a country has signed a formal treaty.1 18 The only way for a
115. Tomz, supra note 27.
116. Id. at 24-28.
117. Status of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS,
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
118. See generally Bradley & Gulati, supra note 91. See also JACK L. GOLDSMITH &
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country to not be bound by CIL is to be a persistent objector while a
norm of CIL is being formed.1 9 In practice, there are very few ex-
amples of countries being successful objectors.120 Even when a state
has persistently objected, CIL is often considered a "peremptory
norm" where objections are not valid.121 Moreover, these perempto-
ry norms include many of the strongest norms of international law. 122
For our purposes, the relevant takeaway is that CIL is a nearly
universal source of international law prohibiting actions on a range of
topics. Although treaties may arguably be more important than CIL
in modern international affairs,123 CIL is still the subject of a great
deal of international legal scholarship.124 Qualitative or quantitative
observational studies are, however, largely powerless in assessing the
influence of CIL on state behavior, due to lack of variance in its ap-
plicability. In other words, since this source of law applies to every
country, traditional research designs cannot determine whether CIL
has played a role in many important changes in state behavior.
ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
119. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 91, at 205 (discussing INT'L LAW Ass'N, COMM.
ON THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2000)).
There was a symposium on this issue in 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2010).
120. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 91, at 211 ("Persistent objection must involve
affirmative international communications, not mere silence or adherence to contrary laws or
practices, and there are few examples of agreed-upon successful persistent objection."). For
a discussion of the theory behind the persistent objector doctrine, see Joel P. Trachtman,
Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the Utility of Customary International Law, 21 DUKE
J. COM. & INT'L L. 221 (2010).
121. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 91, at 212-13 (discussing the "modem" view
that there are a small subset of norms with special status); id. at 212-13, n.37 (quoting
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344)
("For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.").
122. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 91, at 212-13 (listing genocide, torture, and
slavery as practices banned by CIL) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987)).
123. Cf Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 115, 119 (2005) ("modem international relations have made the treaty a more important
tool, relative to CIL, than it has been in the past"). But cf John J. Chung, Customary
International Law as Explained by Status Instead of Contract, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 609, 609 (2012) ("[CIL] forms the foundation of international law.").
124. See Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 11-15 (discussing lines of research in
CIL while arguing that there should be more empirical research on the topic).
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Although observational studies are generally unable to ade-
quately deal with the lack of variance of CIL, experimental research
can help establish whether it is at least plausible that customary in-
ternational law is having an impact on state behavior. A number of
experiments have sought to assess the impact of international law
without references to specific treaties.125 For example, Tonya Put-
nam and Jacob Shapiro conducted an experiment to evaluate whether
individuals are more likely to support actions being taken against a
state that violates human rights when they are informed those harms
are violating international law.126 As part of their experiment, they
told some respondents nothing about international law, others that a
country was violating a treaty, and still another group just that they
were violating international law generally.127 The results indicate
that although information about international law changes public
opinion, general references to international law have roughly the
same effect on public opinion as references to signed treaties. 128 The
result is particularly interesting, because it suggests that international
law without a treaty-customary international law-may still have an
influence on policy preferences and outcomes. Thus, experimental
research can estimate whether CIL may matter, while observational
studies cannot, given a lack of variance in the applicability of cus-
tomary norms.
B. Narrow Ranges of Time for Analysis
To draw reliable inferences from the data in a large-n empiri-
cal study, it is necessary to analyze a sufficiently long time period to
have a big enough sample of observations.1 2 9 This can pose a prob-
lem for observational studies of international events because often
only relatively short time frames can be analyzed. By giving the re-
searcher greater control, for example by allowing the generation of
new data, experimental methods can help overcome this obstacle.
Narrow time frames of analysis have posed a considerable
problem for observational studies. Mindful of this concern, scholars
125. See, e.g., Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 27; Wallace, supra note 27.
126. See Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 27.
127. Id. at 15. It is worth noting that a fourth treatment group was told that there was a
relevant treaty, but that the country had not signed it. Id.
128. Id. at 19.
129. Obviously there is great variation in the time frame that should be analyzed
depending on the question being studied. There are excellent studies that are able to focus
on a relatively few number of years and others that examine hundreds of years.
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of international phenomena (wars, alliances, trading patterns, etc.) of-
ten construct datasets that cover the entire post-war period, 130 the en-
tire twentieth century, 13 1 or even over 200 years.132 The approach of
historically extending datasets, however, is often simply not available
to scholars of international law. There are often very short windows
when there is variation in the number of countries that have signed
treaties. A related problem results if an insufficient number of events
to study occurs during these windows. Experimental methods can
help overcome both of these problems by exploring hypothetical sce-
narios or interning in the field to generate new data.
1. Short Windows Before Widespread Ratification
When researching the effect of international law, scholars are
typically only able to analyze the period during which the relevant
treaty, court, or institution was in effect. However, although it has
ancient roots,133 the corpus of international law has mostly formed
relatively recently.134 As a consequence, even in the best cases,
scholars of international law are left studying the short time periods
130. See, e.g., James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil
War, 97 AM. POL. SC. REv. 75 (2003) (analyzing a dataset of civil war onset from 1945 to
1999).
131. See, e.g., Alexander B. Downes, Restraint or Propellant? Democracy and Civilian
Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 872 (2007) (analyzing a dataset of
interstate wars between 1900 and 2003 to assess whether democracies are more likely to kill
civilians during wars).
132. See, e.g., Jason Lyall, Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents?
Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration, 64 INT'L ORG. 167
(2010) (analyzing a dataset from 1800 to 2005 to study the effectiveness of democracies in
fighting counterinsurgencies).
133. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil", 35 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 8 (2010) ("'International Humanitarian Law' is a term of the past century alone
even though the notion of regulating and limiting warfare is almost as ancient as wars
themselves").
134. For example, much of human rights law emerged after World War II. See Jacob
Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARv. INT'L L.J. 321, 322-23
(2011) ("While strands of such international human rights law date back hundreds of years
in the protection of certain foreign nationals, such as diplomats, from state action or inaction
deemed unlawful, its flowering would only begin to occur in the mid-twentieth century
when, in the wake of World War II, international law's shelter extended fundamentally
beyond that limited population to encompass a state's control of its own people.") (citations
omitted). For documentation of the growth of international courts and tribunals during this
period, see Cesare P.R. Romano, A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions, 2 J.
INT'L DisP. SETTLEMENT 241 (2011).
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during which international law has gone into effect.135 This problem
is exacerbated by the fact that it is often not prudent, or possible, to
study the entire time that an international treaty or institution has
been in effect. As was explained in Part III.A,136 analyzing causation
requires the presence of variation, and many international treaties
have been so widely adopted that there is not sufficient variation in
their treatment.137
A window during which there was sufficient variation in the
adoption of the treaty could ameliorate this causation problem. For
example, if there were several decades during which only half the
world had ratified the CEDAW, it might be possible to compare the
treatment of women during that period to understand whether the
presence of the treaty changed behavior.138 However, many recent
international agreements are being quickly ratified by many states.
To illustrate this point, we have collected data on when states ratified
the human rights agreements and armed conflict treaties discussed in
Part II.B.13 9 This information is presented in Figure 3 & Figure 4.140
135. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Domestic
Sources of Trade Law & Policy (Nov. 4, 2012) (working paper) (on file with authors)
(analyzing United States compliance with WTO decisions from 1996 to 2010). But see
Morrow, supra note 5 (looking at compliance with the laws of war for the entire twentieth
century by using a series of different treaties as the "treatment").
136. See supra text accompanying notes 88-128.
137. See supra Figure 1 & Figure 2.
138. This is the approach implicitly taken by Beth Simmons in her book analyzing the
success of human rights agreements. See SIMMONS, supra note 4.
139. See supra notes 103-12.
140. For information on the sources used to collect data for these Figures, see supra
note 101.
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Figure 3: Ratification Timing
of Human Rights Treaties
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As the figures show, not only do these major agreements have
many signatories, but several of the more recent treaties reached
these signatory numbers in just a few decades. In the most extreme
case, there were 150 countries that were parties to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child within three years of when it went into effect
in 1990. Similarly, there were 150 parties to Additional Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions twenty years after it opened for signature,
and 142 parties to Additional Protocol II during that same time. This
same trend emerged with a number of other major international
agreements. For example, the Kyoto Protocol went into force on
February 16, 2005.141 Today, there are 192 parties to the agree-
ment. 142 Similarly, the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court (establishing the ICC) went into force on July 1, 2002.143 To-
day, there are 122 members to the agreement. 144
141. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997,37 I.L.M. 22.
142. Id.
143. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9.
144. Id.
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Figure 4: Ratification Timing
of Laws of War Treaties
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Although these issues present serious hurdles to research de-
signs based on observational data, experimental methods can provide
one way to overcome them. First, because experiments can use hy-
pothetical vignettes that vary relevant facts about countries, research-
ers are not restricted to analyzing events that occurred in the time
frame before widespread adoption of treaties. For example, as dis-
cussed in Part II.A, Mike Tomz conducted an experiment on the im-
pact that ratification of the NPT has on threat perception, even
though he did not conduct the experiment when there was still vari-
ance in which countries had signed the NPT. 145 Even if the amount
of time before treaties are widely adopted grows shorter in the future,
it can still be possible to see if the treaty regime can theoretically al-
ter policy preferences and beliefs.
2. Laws Regulating Infrequent Events
The problem created by the short time frames between when
treaties are negotiated and when they are widely adopted is exacer-
bated if the treaty regulates events that happen infrequently. An ex-
ample is Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
which went into effect in 1978.146 This treaty is the most compre-
145. See Tomz, supra note 27; see also supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
146. Protocol I, supra note 111.
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hensive attempt to regulate armed interstate conflicts.1 4 7 By at least
one count, there were only fourteen interstate wars before the treaty
had over 160 signatures in 2003.148 It thus is incredibly difficult to
conduct large-n observational research on whether the treaty has
helped change the behavior of states engaged in armed conflicts.
An advantage of experimental designs is that they can explore
topics that have occurred relatively infrequently. For example, the
aforementioned wide adoption of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions has certainly made it difficult to conclusively determine
whether the law has influenced state behavior during conflict. 149 As
a way to address this problem, author Chilton presented respondents
with a hypothetical future conflict in which violations of the laws of
war were occurring. 50 This experiment produced evidence that in-
formation on the status of the laws of war changes public opinion 51
but suggested that the information does not have an additive effect
over other similar arguments.1 52 Although the experiment does not
conclude the debate on whether states change their behavior as a con-
sequence of ratifying treaties on the laws of war, it does bring to the
discussion new evidence simply unavailable through reexamining the
observational data on the same set of conflicts. As these examples
illustrate, experimental designs can help avoid the problems created
by the short windows of time between when a treaty is ratified and
when it is widely adopted.
147. See George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1991) ("[Additional
Protocol I] is the most important treaty codifying and developing international humanitarian
law since the adoption of the four [Geneva] Conventions themselves; and it is the first such
treaty since 1907 to deal with methods and means of warfare and the protection of the
civilian population from the effects of warfare.").
148. See Alexander B. Downes, Web Appendix for How Smart and Tough Are
Democracies? Reassessing Theories ofDemocratic Victory in War, 33 INT'L SECURITY 9 (on
file with author) (providing documentation for the wars used in his large empirical project to
analyze the number of civilians killed during interstate wars).
149. Compare Morrow, supra note 5 (finding that democracies are likely to follow the
laws of war when reciprocation is likely), with Valentino et al., supra note 5, (finding no
evidence that states, including democracies, change their behavior as a result of the laws of
war).
150. See Chilton, supra note 27.
151. Id. at 16-21.
152. Id. at 21-24. For an explanation of how experiments can be designed to test
causal mechanisms, see Imai, Tingley & Yamamoto, supra note 33; Imai, Keele, Tingley &
Yamamoto, supra note 33. For other examples of research using related approaches to test
causal mechanisms, see Tingley & Tomz, supra note 24; Tomz & Weeks, supra note 20.
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C. Overlapping Legal Constraints
To conduct reliable causal analysis, researchers must also iso-
late the effects of competing causal claims. This requirement, how-
ever basic, is often very difficult to satisfy. For example, the difficul-
ty may arise because two or more factors hypothesized to cause a
given phenomenon may occur simultaneously: democracies may be
less likely to fight each other because they have more transparent
governments or because they are more likely to have intertwined
economic relationships.1 53 Since both of these factors are observed
in the real world, it is difficult to know which (if either) makes de-
mocracies less likely to fight. Experimental methods overcome this
problem by isolating which causal claims are tested.
Qualitative or quantitative observational studies assessing the
impact of international law on state behavior often have difficulty un-
tangling the effects of overlapping legal constraints. As the study of
international law moves from analyzing whether states comply with
the treaties and agreements they sign toward assessing whether those
agreements make a causal impact on state behavior, 154 it is increas-
ingly important for scholars to perform credible causal analysis by
isolating effects of specific agreements. 55 To do so, scholars have
focused on analyzing the impact of the ratification of an individual
treatyl 56-or participation in an international institution 157-on
changes in policy.
1. Overlapping International Treaties
Isolating the causal effect of any individual treaty or institu-
tion, however, is complicated because countries are often bound by
several international legal agreements with overlapping legal obliga-
tions and constraints. Given the rapid growth of international law in
the last sixty years, most states are subject to overlapping interna-
tional treaty objections in many areas. For example, there were over
50,000 treaties on file with the U.N. Treaty System as of 2005.158
153. See Tomz & Weeks, supra note 27 at 21-24.
154. See Posner, supra note 9.
155. Cf Ho & Rubin, supra note 7, at 21-22 (explaining the importance of focusing on
a single "treatment" when performing causal analysis).
156. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 4.
157. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 11.
158. Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
573, 574 (2005).
204 [ 52:173
EXPERIMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The result of this massive proliferation in international legal agree-
ments has been that these agreements increasingly create conflicting
and overlapping obligations.159 As a result, it can be difficult to
know whether any specific international law is having an effect;
states may be complying with it because of a different international
agreement, or failing to comply or remain compliant because of other
conflicting international legal agreements.
To illustrate, we present Figures 5 & Figure 6, showing how
many of the treaties discussed in Part II.A. 1 & Part II.B. 1 states are
party to. As Figure 5 shows, 123 states are party to all six major hu-
man rights treaties. Figure 6 shows that 125 states are party to the
four treaties governing armed conflict. Significantly, these treaties
contain common elements, and efforts that states take in response to
one agreement may fall under the scope of another agreement. 160
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159. See id. at 574 ("The very success of treaties as a policy tool has caused a new
dilemma: a surfeit of treaties that often overlap and, with increasing frequency, conflict with
one another."). The increase in conflicting and overlapping international legal agreements
has led the international legal community to study the impact of this "fragmentation." See
generally Int'l Law Comm'n, Report on the Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion ofInternational Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (by Martti Koskenniemi); see also Roger P. Alford, The
Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International Adjudication in
Ascendance, 94 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 160 (2000).
160. For example, Article I of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR protect the "right of
self-determination." See ICCPR, supra note 103, art. I; ICESCR, supra note 104, art. I.
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These constraints are often collinear, making it particularly
difficult for observational studies to isolate the effect of a single trea-
ty. Collinearity occurs when a variable of interest strongly correlates
with another variable (or set of variables) that offer a potential expla-
nation for a phenomenon.161 When this occurs, it is difficult-if not
impossible-to tease out the causal effects of these strongly related
factors.1 62 For example, when there are multiple treaties that seek to
protect minority rights with similar ratification patterns, it might be
impossible to tell which, if any, treaty is doing anything to protect
minority rights. That is to say, if the set of countries that have signed
agreement X is the same as that of countries that have signed agree-
ment Y, the ratification of those two agreements is collinear, making
it impossible to know the causal effect of either treaty on an outcome
of interest.
Figure 6: Number of Treaties on Armed
Conflicts that Countries Have Signed
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Using experimental research designs can help researchers di-
rectly address the problems posed by the presence of overlapping le-
gal constraints that confound observational studies. For one, experi-
mental designs vary information that would be collinear in
observational data. That is, even if nearly all countries that have rati-
161. As an informal definition, two variables can be said to be collinear when one
variable can perfectly predict the other. See KING, KEOHANE & VERBA, supra note 88, at
122-24, 213-15, for a discussion on this problem.
162. See Tomz & Weeks, supra note 20, at 4-5, for an excellent discussion of the
problem that collinearity poses for testing whether there is a democratic peace.
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fled treaty X have also ratified treaty Y-making observational stud-
ies futile-that information can be varied during experimental re-
search. For example, there has been a great deal of debate among
scholars of international relations on whether there is a "democratic
peace" (that is, are democracies less likely to fight wars with each
other). 163 However, the presence of democracy is often collinear
with other variables that might explain peace (i.e. shared political in-
terests), hindering scholars using observational data.164 To solve this
problem, Mike Tomz and Jessica Weeks recently conducted a survey
experiment that varied the information provided to respondents on a
number of variables that had been hypothesized to both cause peace
and be collinear by democracy. 165 This way, Tomz and Weeks pro-
vided new evidence that individuals are less supportive of war with
countries that are democratic, even compared to autocracies similar
in all relevant respects. Importantly, this example illustrates how it
would be possible to use an experimental design that varies whether a
state is party to different treaties, even if this distribution of ratifica-
tion is not common in the actual world.166
2. Overlapping Domestic Laws
A related problem is that states that have signed international
legal agreements on a given topic may also have domestic laws on
the same subjects. Although there has been a continual academic de-
bate on degrees of difference between international and domestic
law,16 7 scholars have long recognized that countries often have inter-
163. See generally MICHAEL E. BROWN, SEAN M. LYNN-JONES & STEVEN E. MILLER,
DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1996).
164. See Henry S. Farber & Joanne Gowa, Common Interests or Common Polities?
Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace, 59 J. POL. 393 (1997); see also JOANNE GOWA,
BALLOTS AND BULLETS: THE ELUSIVE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1999).
165. See Tomz & Weeks, supra note 20.
166. If the research design used hypothetical countries, then this would be possible to
do without deceiving subjects. If, however, the researcher hopes to ask questions about
specific countries, it might only be possible to utilize this approach if subjects are deceived
about whether a country has ratified a specific treaty (or set of treaties). This introduces an
ethical question that is central to experimental research. For a discussion on the issue of
deceiving subjects, see infra text accompanying notes 266-68.
167. There has obviously been an incredible amount of scholarship over the years
analyzing the relationship between international law and domestic law. For just a few recent
examples, see, Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic
and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011) (arguing that international law is enforced
through the process of denying violators of law from the benefits of membership in a
community, while domestic law is primarily-although not exclusively--enforced through a
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national laws and domestic laws that cover the same subjects.168
This could either be because countries select into international legal
agreements that do not impose onerous new requirements,169 or be-
cause countries quickly change their domestic laws to mirror the in-
ternational legal agreements they have signed.170 In either scenario,
the presence of two laws covering the same topic makes it difficult to
causally assess the degree to which the international law is responsi-
ble for changes in state behavior.171 This phenomenon will increase
if international law continues regulating more areas previously solely
in the sphere of national regulation.172
In addition to the problem that exists when these agreements
monopoly on the use of force within a territory); Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Laws
for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1791
(2009) (analyzing the similarities and differences between domestic constitutional law and
international law); Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International
Divide: Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 155 (2004) (arguing
that we should move away from the "structural/functional" divide in the study of
international and domestic law).
168. Cf Karen Knop, RalfMichaels & Annelise Riles, International Law in Domestic
Courts: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 103 AM. SocY INT'L L. PROC. 269 (2009) (arguing
that the relationship between international law and domestic law should be understood
through a conflict of laws approach).
169. See infra Part IIE; see generally Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, supra note 10, at
382-87 (arguing that countries may only sign international legal agreements when they do
not constitute a major change from what the country would have done in the absence of the
agreement).
170. For a number of excellent case studies documenting countries that have changed
their laws to incorporate international legal agreements they have signed, see SIMMONS,
supra note 4. For example, Simmons documents how Japan passed a number of laws to
expand the rights of women in the workplace following the country becoming a party to the
CEDAW. Id. at 237-45.
171. Of course, if signing an international legal agreement were to result in changes in
domestic law it would still be evidence of the causal effect of international law. Cf Shaffer
& Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 15 (reviewing a previous debate between Simmons and Von
Stein and concluding that anticipatory changes to currency regimes to join the IMF still can
be viewed as evidence of the effect of the IMFs legal rules on state policy). The difficulty,
however, is that with large-n observational studies, it can be difficult to be confident of this
causal link without more in depth research.
172. See generally Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52
HARV. INT'L L.J. 321 (2011) (arguing that international law has moved from just placing
obligations on states to direct regulation of individuals, corporations, and other actors). See
also Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is
Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327 (2006) (arguing that
international law must increasingly move from regulation of nations to direct engagement
with domestic institutions).
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are collinear-as discussed in the last section-observational studies
have difficulty accounting for all of a state's legal obligations. This
requires a huge amount of country-level research, or expertise, that is
impracticable for most large-n studies. Although it may be possible
to account for all of a country's treaty commitments in a statistical
model in some cases,7 3 or even for a country's constitutional
laws,174 having a model that incorporates data on countries' domestic
laws on specific topics may be an all but impossible task. Instead,
scholars have included variables that account for characteristics of
countries' legal regimes-like the degree to which a country is dem-
ocratic-without including terms to account for all relevant legal ob-
ligations. 175
Experimental designs can also help test whether international
law has an effect beyond domestic law without needing huge
amounts of country-specific data. This is because experiments can
test whether international law has an "additive" effect-as opposed
to a "substitute" effect-on mass or elite opinion beyond the pres-
ence of domestic law or other international agreements.1 76 Imagine,
for instance, a survey measuring public support for the war on terror,
with one group of respondents told that torture violates domestic
laws, a second one told that torture violates a signed international
treaty, and a third told that torture violates both. If public opinion on
torture were to be the same in all groups (Group 1 = Group 2 =
173. See Yonatan Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty Commitments: Using the
Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects, AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://dss.ucsd.edu/-ylupu/Informative%2OPower.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (using
countries' history of ratifying treaties to perform statistical matching as a means of
controlling for selection effects).
174. See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009) (exploring a huge amount of data collected on countries'
current and historical national constitutions). See also David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The
Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 762 (2012)
(analyzing data on the world's constitutions to assess the influence of the United States
Constitution on elements of constitutions adopted by other countries).
175. For example, in perhaps the most careful empirical analysis of the effect that
human rights agreements have on domestic laws, Simmons analyzed whether countries that
had ratified specific treaties were more likely to respect the human rights covered by those
agreements. See SIMMONS, supra note 4. Although her models include a huge number of
variables, they do not include terms of other related treaties or the presence of other relevant
domestic laws.
176. For a discussion of the difference between "additive" and "substitute" effects as
it relates to international law, see Tomz, supra note 27, at 19-21. See also Chilton, supra
note 27 (using an experimental research design that tests if the laws of war have an additive
effect beyond moral arguments against targeting civilians).
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Group 3), then international law would here have a "substitute" ef-
fect.177 However, if information on international law changed opin-
ion beyond information on domestic law alone (Group 3 > Group 1),
then international law could have an "additive" effect.178 This kind
of experimental design makes it possible to test whether international
law might influence policy outcomes, even when domestic law al-
ready exists on a given topic.179
D. Inadequate Dependent Variables
Being able to accurately measure a dependent variable, or
outcome, is a basic requirement of efficient causal analysis.18 0 For
example, a scholar studying whether states comply with the laws of
war might use civilian deaths during a given conflict as a dependent
variable.181 This often poses problems for observational studies, be-
cause relevant dependent variables may be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to measure. Experimental methods, on the other hand, often
have the advantage of generating the dependent variable of interest
itself.
As we have discussed, as scholarship on international law has
become more empirical,18 2 scholars have shifted their attention to try-
ing to understand whether international law causes states to change
their behavior.183 To quantitatively analyze whether states change
their behavior to become compliant with a given treaty as a conse-
quence of committing to that agreement, however, researchers must
have a dependent variable that measures compliance.184 This founda-
tional requirement poses two significant problems for researchers
177. That is to say that the information on international law merely substituted the
effect that was created by simply being told about domestic law.
178. That is to say that the information on international law added to the change in
public opinion beyond the change in public opinion created by domestic law alone.
179. It is worth noting that the same approach can be used to test whether two
international legal agreements might have a larger effect than a single international legal
agreement.
180. See Chilton, supra note 27, at 77. For a longer discussion of dependent variables,
see id. at 107-09.
181. See, e.g., Valentino et al., supra note 5.
182. See generally Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1.
183. See Posner, supra note 9; see also Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1.
184. Cf KING, KEOHANE & VERBA, supra note 88, at 109 ("[I]n social science, we must
be careful to ensure that we are really interested in understanding our dependent variable,
rather than the background factors that our research design holds constant").
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studying international law compliance: first, existing data sources
might not be directly interpretable as a measure of compliance; and
second, in many cases, observational data of compliance might not
exist, or even be possible to collect.
1. Existing Data Sources Do Not Accurately Measure Compliance
In some cases, scholars have been able to identify research
questions where it is possible to directly observe and measure non-
compliance. For example, in a groundbreaking article on compliance
with international law, Beth Simmons analyzed whether states com-
ply with commitments they have made under the IMF Articles of
Agreement by leaving their current accounts free from restriction.185
In this case, Simmons was able to use a dependent variable that was a
direct and clear measure of non-compliance. 186
Things are not always so straightforward. Instead, available
sources of data may not provide easily interpretable measures of
compliance or non-compliance. One criticism that has been raised
along these lines is that scholars have often used dependent variables
that may not perfectly map to whether a state is compliant with an in-
ternational legal obligation. For example, in her book on compliance
with human rights, Beth Simmons uses a binary variable for states
that have free practice of religion.' 8 7 Eric Posner has criticized this
measure, however, for not necessarily measuring compliance with the
ICCPR. 88
A related problem occurs when the dependent variables that
are used are not binary-as in the two examples just discussed from
Simmons' research-but instead are on some kind of scale.189 The
difficulty in these cases is that even if a state changes its behavior af-
ter ratifying an international treaty, and there is movement on the de-
pendent variable, it is unclear when "compliance" has occurred. As
a result, existing empirical studies of compliance with international
185. Simmons, supra note 11.
186. Id. at 833.
187. See SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 386.
188. Posner, supra note 9, at 6-7.
189. See, e.g., Yonatan Lupu, Limited Constraints: Veto Players and the Effects of
International Human Rights Agreements (2012) (working paper) (on file with author) (using
the measure of human rights protection from the CIRI project as a dependent variable for
compliance with treaty obligations); see also Moonhawk Kim, Yvonne M. Dutton & Cody
Eldredge, Why Ratify? Reservations, Institutional Changes, and Commitment to Human
Rights Treaties (2012) (working paper) (on file with author).
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law may open themselves to criticism for using dependent variables
that fail to fully capture compliance.190
A third problem is that the best available dependent variables
for use might not measure compliance directly at all, but instead be
proxies for consequences of compliance. For example, when analyz-
ing whether states change their policies after ratifying the Convention
on Political Rights of Women, Oona Hathaway uses the percentage
of men in a country's legislature as the dependent variable.191 As
Hathaway admits, however, equal representation is not required by
the convention. The dependent variable is thus a proxy for compli-
ance, making it debatable whether it adequately captures compli-
ance. 192
Experimental methods offer a way to directly solve all three
of these problems. That is, experiments can directly generate evi-
dence of whether a state complies with international law. For exam-
ple, Baradaran et al. recently conducted possibly the first such field
experiment on compliance with international law.1 93 The researchers
sent requests for information on incorporating a shell company to
1,015 firms offering incorporation services in 182 countries.194 As
the experimental treatment, they randomized whether firms were giv-
en any facts on the status of international law.1 95 To comply with in-
ternational financial transparency laws, firms must demand proof of
identity before providing incorporation services.19 6 By carefully
wording the requests, the researchers were able to directly measure
whether firms were willing to violate international law in their re-
sponses.197 This experimental approach bypassed complaints of ex-
isting data sources inadequately measuring international law compli-
ance, because the responses to the experiment itself were evidence of
non-compliance. In other words, the dependent variable was a good
190. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 12, at 173-78 (criticizing Hathaway,
supra note 4, for using dependent variables that do not fully capture compliance with human
rights agreements).
191. Hathaway, supra note 4, at 1975-76.
192. For other criticisms about Hathaway's selection of dependent variables, see
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 12, at 174 for an argument that Hathaway's selection of
dependent variables do not "account for strategies governments often adopt in response to
improved enforcement of a norm."
193. Baradaran et al., supra note 7, at 7-8.
194. Id. at 37.
195. Id. at 38-39.
196. Id. at 43.
197. Id. at 42-44.
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measure of compliance, because it was itself the original, direct
measure.
2. Data on Compliance Is Not Available
In addition to existing data sources not being ideal measures
of non-compliance, sometimes data on whether compliance is occur-
ring is altogether unavailable. When dependent variables do not ex-
ist, scholars must collect original data on state treaty compliance.
Notably, despite the effort it involves, original data collection is an
incredibly valuable service. It is a worthwhile step; the data should be
made public more often.198
That said, original data collection on compliance with interna-
tional law is not always possible. First, it may require extensive re-
search into the practices of many countries. For example, if field re-
search is required to determine whether a state complies with an
international agreement, it is challenging for a researcher to visit
enough countries to conduct a large-n study. Second, data on com-
pliance with a particular international agreement may not be publicly
available. For example, it may be impossible to collect accurate data
on whether states comply with the Convention Against Torture. 199
Moreover, even if it is possible to find some national-level data, there
might be considerable unaccounted-for subnational variation.
In addition to these obstacles, scholars using empirical meth-
ods to research compliance with international law overlook the fact
that international treaties often guarantee the protection of a large
number of rights.2 00 As a result, even if a dependent variable is
available to measure one commitment contained within the treaty, it
might not be plausible to find observational data that measures all of
the steps required for a country to be compliant.
To illustrate, Figure 7 presents the number of individual rights
198. See Gary King, Ensuring the Data-Rich Future of the Social Sciences, 331 Sci.
MAG. 719, 720 (2011) (discussing the value of posting and sharing data). For an example of
a recent international law article that engaged in original data collection for the project's
dependent variable, see Brewster & Chilton, supra note 135, where the authors collect data
on the dates on which the United States took steps to comply with adverse rulings in the
WTO.
199. See CAT, supra note 107.
200. See Posner, supra note 9, at 7 for a criticism of the use of dependent variables in
SIMMONS, supra note 4, because human rights treaties "collectively contain dozens or maybe
even hundreds of provisions."
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protected in the six major human rights treaties. 201 As it shows, the
average number of rights protected in the agreements is thirty-one.
The ICCPR protects fifty-seven different rights, ranging from the
right to not be imprisoned due to debt 202 to the right to marry and
found a family. 203 As a result, when dependent variable data is only
available for a few of the rights within such a treaty, it may be diffi-
cult to reliably test whether states comply.
Figure 7: Number of Rights Protected by
Major Human Rights Agreements
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Experiments provide an appealing alternative to observational
studies when it is not possible to collect data on compliance. In addi-
tion to using the above-discussed approach of Baradaran et al. to col-
lect direct evidence of non-compliance, 204 experimental methods can
also test the theoretical mechanisms presented for how a specific
treaty might influence behavior. For example, in a recent study,
Geoffrey Wallace set out to examine whether the Convention Against
Torture205 might have an influence on America's use of torture in the
war on terror.206 Wallace studied whether international law exerts an
independent influence on state behavior by directly examining one
theoretical mechanism by which this might occur: altering domestic
201. See sources cited supra notes 103-08.
202. See ICCPR, supra note 103, art. 11.
203. Id. art. 23.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
205. CAT, supra note 107.
206. Wallace, supra note 27.
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mass political views. 207 Wallace conducted two survey experiments
on national samples of American adults, and the experimental treat-
ment was that he varied the information about international law be-
fore gauging respondent views on the acceptability of torture. 208
Wallace's experiment showed that international law changes support
for the use of torture by roughly six percentage points, meaning in-
ternational law might change policies on torture without having to
have a dependent variable that directly measures torture itself.209
E. Selection Bias
Another barrier to reliable causal inference-and one that has
received the most attention in the international law context-is selec-
tion bias. 210 Selection bias occurs when the observations that have
received a particular treatment are systematically related to a poten-
tial outcome. 211 For example, if a researcher were attempting to es-
timate the effect of taking a test preparation course on LSAT scores,
producing a reliable causal estimate may be complicated by the fact
that the students who elect to take such a course (receive the treat-
ment) may be more conscientious students, who were likely to score
higher (the potential outcome) than other students, regardless of en-
rollment. Experimental research helps solve this problem because
subjects are randomly assigned to treatments, instead of self-selecting
into them.
Although at least one other scholar has explained how exper-
iments can help overcome the problems caused by selection bias in
international law, 2 12 we will also explain briefly. In the study of in-
ternational law, producing reliable causal estimates of international
agreements and institutions has been frustrated, because countries
207. Id. at 106-07.
208. Id. at 117-19.
209. Id. at 119.
210. See generally Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 1, at 89-90 (summarizing research
on the influence of selection effects on compliance with international law). For an early and
prominent example of scholarship on international law drawing attention to selection effects,
see Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, supra note 10, which argues that previous claims that
international law is generally complied with ignore a variety of barriers to inference,
including selection effects.
211. For a clear statement of the definition of selection bias, see ALAN S. GERBER &
DONALD P. GREEN, FIELD EXPERIMENTS: DESIGN, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION 37-39
(2012). See also KING, KEOHANE & VERBA, supra note 88, at 135-37.
212. See Tomz, supra note 27, at 11.
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choosing to participate in international legal regimes may be system-
atically different than those that are not. 2 13 This reality is a major
problem for observational studies on international law 2 14 that exper-
imental research can help solve.
1. Selection Bias and International Treaties
The issue that has received perhaps the most attention from
scholars of international law is whether states comply with interna-
tional treaties that they have consented to. 2 15 Although scholars were
initially primarily concerned with examining whether states comply
with agreements, in recent years research has evolved to focus more
on whether states alter their behavior as a consequence of committing
to international legal agreements. 216 The difficulty, however, is that
whether a given state chooses to commit to an international treaty is
not random. 217 Instead, there are a number of strategic calculations
that determine whether states choose to agree to international trea-
ties. 218 As a result, it is reasonable to think that the states that select
into international treaties are systematically different from those
states that do not. This selection bias thus presents an inferential
problem, making it difficult for international law scholars to study
the effects of international agreements. 219
213. See, e.g., von Stein, supra note 12 (discussing how selection bias called the causal
effects of previous research into question). But see Simmons & Hopkins, supra note 12
(responding to many of von Stein's criticisms).
214. But cf Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 1, at 89 n.231 (citing studies that have
used "sophisticated methods" like instrumental regression and matching to obtain valid
inferences on the effects of international law).
215. Cf, e.g., Simmons, supra note 1.
216. See Posner, supra note 9, at 5 (distinguishing between "compliance" and
"causation" approaches). Compare Chayes & Chayes, supra note 8 (discussing how states
have generally high levels of compliance with the international agreements they consent to),
with SIMMoNS, supra note 4 (empirically testing whether committing to international human
rights agreements alters those states' human rights practices).
217. For a discussion of this issue, i.e., the inferential problem caused by the fact that
states do not randomly choose to sign treaties, see Tomz, supra note 27, at 7-8.
218. See, e.g., Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, Regulating Conflict: Historical Legacies and
State Commitment to the Laws of War, 8 FOREIGN POL'Y ANALYSIS 151 (2012) (examining
why states commit to treaties on the laws of war); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do
Nations Join Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RES. 588 (2007) (examining why
states consent to international human rights treaties); SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 57-111
(developing a theory of why states commit to international human rights agreements).
219. See, e.g., von Stein, supra note 12 (discussing the problems posed by selection
216 [52:173
EXPERIMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Experimental methods can help to solve this problem because
they allow researchers to randomize whether participants are told that
a country has ratified a particular treaty. 220 For example, political
scientists Tingley & Tomz recently tested Americans' willingness to
take retaliatory actions against a country that has increased its con-
sumption of fossil fuels. 221 Half of the respondents were told that the
country had said it would not increase its use of fossil fuels; the other
half were told that the country had signed a treaty promising that it
would not do so. 222 The respondents that were told that the country
had signed a treaty were 14% more likely to support economic sanc-
tions against the country than those that were simply told the country
said it would not do so (51% compared to 37%).223 Since the as-
signment of the experimental treatment (being told a treaty had been
signed) was randomized, the survey experiment suggests that leaders
may have incentives to treat countries that have signed international
agreements differently than those that have not. If the authors had
instead simply observed U.S. responses to polluting countries that
had signed treaties, it would be difficult to draw reliable inferences
on the influence of the treaty because countries that signed it may
have been systematically different from those that did not. These dif-
ferences could be directly related to the dependent variable-for ex-
ample, the states that ratified the treaty may be the same states that
U.S. citizens are more willing to take actions against in general-and
thus induce bias. Experimental methods thus help to overcome selec-
tion bias problems and directly measure the causal inference of
treatments.
2. Selection Bias and International Litigation
Relatedly, litigation in international courts suffers from selec-
tion bias. 224 Simply put, disputes that parties choose to litigate until a
bias for Simmons, supra note 11). It is important to note that scholars have begun to try to
address these problems using a number of sophisticated statistical methods. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-14; see also Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 1, at 89 n.231.
220. See, e.g., Tomz, supra note 27 (using this approach in what we believe to be the
first experimental test of whether information on the status of international law changes
policy views).
221. Tingley & Tomz, supra note 27.
222. Id. at 26-27.
223. Id. at 28.
224. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court
of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STuD. 599, 614 (2005) (discussing how selection bias causes
a problem for studying litigation in the ICJ because the cases that make it to the ICJ may not
2013]1 217
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
judicial decision is reached are likely to be systematically different
from other cases. This is not just true of international law, but of liti-
gation generally. 225 For example, disputes that reach a judgment may
be systematically different from the universe of cases because easy
cases are settled and hard cases are not, or because it may not be eco-
nomically feasible to pursue cases when small amounts of money are
at stake. Regardless of the reason, the implication is that it is diffi-
cult to draw inferences about the effects of litigation on the settle-
ment of disputes.
Once again, experimental research can help overcome these
selection biases. For example, even if observational research of
scholars interested in whether countries change their policies after
WTO disputes 226 showed that countries changed their policies as a
result of adverse WTO decisions, this would not necessarily be a re-
sult of any adverse WTO decision. Instead, states may only bring
complaints in situations when they believed a country would be re-
sponsive to an adverse ruling, as when the issue is not too politically
sensitive. Experimental methods could be used to test this by, for in-
stance, presenting a hypothetical trade dispute and randomizing
whether respondents are told a foreign country has strongly alleged
violations of international trade law, or whether the WTO has issued
a decision supporting those allegations. This would allow a re-
searcher to directly test whether the litigation itself could influence
opinions-and in turn policy responses by democratically accounta-
ble officials-or whether the nature of the dispute and allegation it-
self has the same effect. As a result, experimental methods also pre-
sent one way to overcome the inferential problem posed by selection
bias in international litigation.
3. Selection Bias and Institutional Design
An additional selection problem common in the study of in-
ternational law, along with treaty ratification and international litiga-
be representative of all possible disputes); see also Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen &
Heiner Schulz, The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal
Integration in the European Union, 52 INT'L ORG. 149, 151-52 (1998) (discussing their
efforts to develop a case identification strategy that will help minimize selection bias).
225. Cf Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced
Selection Bias in the Supreme Court's Agenda, 71 J. POL. 574 (2009) (empirically testing
how the selection bias introduced by the fact that the Supreme Court has discretionary
jurisdiction influences the Court's Agenda).
226. See, e.g., Brewster & Chilton, supra note 135 (analyzing the United States'
compliance with adverse WTO decisions).
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tion, is institutional design. The influence that the designs of interna-
tional institutions have on compliance rates and policy outcomes has
been a major line of inquiry for international law and international
relations scholars. 227 These design features, however, are not neces-
sarily exogenous to joining international institutions. For example,
the dispute settlement mechanism in a particular institution may be
designed to encourage or discourage participation based on ex-ante
compliance rates. In other words, features of international institu-
tions are not randomly selected, making it difficult to study their effi-
cacy using observational data. Still, many international relations and
law scholars are interested in the consequences of institutional design
choices.
This is yet another problem that experimental methods can
help to address. Experiments can be designed in a way that makes
the particular features of international institutions exogenous. For
example, in the same way that Tomz tested whether being told that a
country had ratified the NPT changed the views of British MPs, 228 it
would be possible to design an experiment where the willingness of
decision-makers to utilize a particular international institution is in-
fluenced by being randomly told information on a relevant feature of
the design of that institution. 229
III. CONDUCTING EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
As we have argued, scholars of international law should begin
to embrace experimental methods. Although experimental research
methods are not appropriate ways to study every question, they are
underutilized. Increasing their use, however, requires that interna-
tional legal scholars and political scientists interested in international
law understand in concrete terms how to design, field, and interpret
experiments.
227. For a selection of research on this topic, see DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G. Hawkins, et al. eds., 2006). For a prominent
article on the institutional design of international organizations, see Barbara Koremenos,
Charles Lipton & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT'L
ORG. 761 (2001).
228. See infra text accompanying notes 282-83.
229. As a hypothetical example, a scholar may be interested to know whether the
presence of amicus briefs in a given dispute settlement mechanism affects the likelihood that
countries will pursue litigation through that process. To answer this question, this feature of
an institution could be randomly manipulated in a survey given to government officials that
forced them to consider whether they should pursue litigation in a particular case.
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Although formal training in experimental methods may be the
best way to gain the knowledge and skills required to conduct exper-
imental research, it may not always be possible. Given this reality,
we provide here a brief overview of some issues that researchers hop-
ing to conduct experimental research should consider. Importantly,
researchers interested in conducting experimental research should
first consult one of the many excellent textbooks on experimental
methodology. 230 Second, it might be fruitful for legal scholars to col-
laborate with researchers trained in experimental methodology. 231
Third, any scholar considering conducting experimental research
should make sure to obtain the required research permits from their
university's Institutional Review Board (IRB). 232 Finally, research-
ers should carefully consider what type of experimental design would
be most appropriate for the question that they are hoping to study.
A common schema of experiment types breaks experiments
into three categories: laboratory, survey, and field. 233 Laboratory
experiments range considerably in what they entail, but share a focus
on experimentation in highly controlled laboratory settings. 234 Sur-
vey experiments embed manipulations and randomized frames into
standard public opinion surveys. 235 Field experiments turn to natu-
rally occurring behavior, but manipulate features of the environment
in order to make inferences. 236 A fourth category of experiments is
natural experiments. Natural experiments take advantage of naturally
occurring randomizations to make inferences, 237 such as arbitrarily
230. For good textbook introductions to experimental methods, see MORTON &
WILLIAMS, supra note 36 (providing an overview on how to conduct experimental research);
GERBER & GREEN, supra note 211 (providing an overview specifically on field experiments).
231. For one example of collaboration between political scientists and a legal scholar,
see Baradaran et al., supra note 7.
232. Like many types of research, experimental research requires approval by
University Institutional Review Boards (IRB). IRBs protect both subjects and researchers.
Typically this process entails submitting an application describing the research and
identifying any potential harms. Specific procedures vary somewhat across institutions and
so we direct researchers to their own IRB for more information.
233. See James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski & Arthur Lupia,
Experimentation in Political Science, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
POLITICAL SCIENCE 3, 6 (James N. Druckman et al. eds., 2011) ("[M]ost experiments have
been implemented in one of three contexts: laboratories, surveys, and the field.").
234. Id. at 6-7.
235. Id. at 7.
236. Id.
237. For guidance on finding natural experiment, see Gregory Robinson, John E.
McNulty & Jonathan S. Krasno, Observing the Counterfactual? The Search for Political
220 [52:173
EXPERIMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
drawn legal borders, 238 or the distribution of international election
monitors during elections. 239 Although natural experiments can be
used in legal research, 240 we will not consider them in depth in this
Article, focusing instead on experimental methods where the re-
searcher controls the randomization and other experimental process-
es. We suspect that survey and field experiments will be used more
likely in studies of international law than laboratory experiments, 241
but we discuss all for completeness. We also discuss how issues of
randomization, as well as challenges to internal, 242 external, 243 and
construct validity 24 4 affect each type of experimentation.
In this Part, we provide a minimal foundation in experimental
methods and point scholars to further resources. We specifically dis-
cuss the virtues and vices of different experimental techniques with
respect to international law. Depending on the research questions or
Experiments in Nature, 17 POL. ANAL. 341 (2009). For additional advice on establishing
whether an event can be considered a natural experiment, see Jasjeet S. Sekhon & Rocio
Titiunik, When Natural Experiments Are Neither Natural Nor Experiments, 106 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 35 (2012) (providing a framework for thinking through assignment and other
concerns that arise when considering if an event is a natural experiment).
238. See, e.g., Daniel N. Posner, The Political Salience of Cultural Differences: Why
Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi, 98 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 530 (2004) (exploiting a natural experiment created by the border between Zambia and
Malawi to argue that political salience of cultural cleavages does not depend on the nature of
the cleavages, but instead on the relative size of the group).
239. See Susan D. Hyde, The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment, 60 WORLD POL. 37 (2007) (exploiting a natural experiment created
during the 2003 Armenian presidential election to show that election monitors can help
reduce fraud at the polling stations they visit).
240. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 77 (using a natural experiment to study the impact of
increased workload on reversal rates in the federal judiciary); Berry & Gersen, supra note 77
(using a natural experiment to study the impact of election timing on public policy
outcomes); see also Benjamin A. Lindy, Note, The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining
Laws on Student Achievement: Evidence from a New Mexico Natural Experiment, 120 YALE
L.J. 1130 (2011); Bebchuk et al., supra note 80.
241. See, e.g., Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 26 (conducting an experiment in a
laboratory setting to test the behavioral influences of international cooperation).
242. Internal validity is defined as: "[t]he approximate truth of the inference or
knowledge claim within a target population studied." MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36,
at 188.
243. External validity is defined as: "[t]he approximate truth of the inference or
knowledge claim for observations beyond the target population studied." Id.
244. Construct validity is defined as: "[w]hether the inferences from the data are valid
for the theory (or constructs) the researcher is evaluating in a theory testing experiment." Id.
at 189.
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context, some types of experiments will be more applicable or easier
to apply. For example, it may be easier to use survey experiments to
study how international law affects public opinion, 245 but it may be
more appropriate to use a field experiment to study how private firms
and public officials respond to information on the status of interna-
tional law. 246 We also update scholars of international law on new
developments within the experimental social sciences. One exciting
area of growth, not surprisingly, is conducting experiments via the
Internet.247 We also discuss pertinent methodological innovations in
the design and analysis of experiments, and how these relate to the
study of international law.
A. Laboratory Experiments
Laboratory experiments use a physical space where experi-
mental subjects respond to carefully controlled stimuli and/or interact
with other subjects. 248 In the social sciences, psychology uses la-
boratory experiments the most.249 In recent years, laboratory exper-
iments have become more common in economics and political sci-
ence. Most laboratory experiments use subjects from either a pre-
existing pool or by targeted recruiting of subjects with specific char-
acteristics (like gender or work experience). 25 0 Many psychology
departments have laboratories with subject pools, and some universi-
ties have broader social science laboratories. 25 1 Experimental ses-
245. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 27 (conducting a survey experiment to evaluate how
information on the legalization of international law affects public opinion on the use of
torture in the war on terror).
246. See, e.g., Findley et al., supra note 25 (conducting a field experiment to evaluate
whether private firms violate international law when responding to requests to incorporate
shell companies).
247. See infra text accompanying notes 278-79.
248. For general background on the use of laboratory experiments in political science,
see Shanto lyengar, Laboratory Experiments in Political Science, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 126-55 (James N. Druckman et al. eds., 2011). For an
overview of the use of laboratory experiments to study political economy, see Thomas R.
Palfrey, Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 379 (2009).
249. Cf Falk & Heckman, supra note 35, at 535 ("With the exception of psychology,
the adoption of laboratory experiments has been much slower in the social sciences,
although during the past two decades use of lab experiments has accelerated.").
250. For an extended discussion on subject recruitment, focusing on the use of students
as subjects, see MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 237-58.
251. For example, Harvard University runs the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory
(HDSL) (http://decisionlab.harvard.edu/), Princeton University runs the Princeton
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sions begin with a consent and instructional process, record data
through computer interfaces, paper and pencil, or experimenter ob-
servation, and end with some form of compensation and debriefing.
Compensation often takes the form of monetary compensation or
class credit. 252
Laboratory experiments are useful for a number of reasons. 253
The ability to precisely control the experimental environment means
that effects are most likely due to the experimental intervention. 25 4
Confounding variables or uncontrolled sources of stimuli are mini-
mized. For example, let us imagine one were interested in whether
international law had any impact on perceptions by members of the
public about the legality of their own government's policies. A la-
boratory experiment could randomly expose individuals to scripts or
videos about either the entailed international law or some neutral
control condition, and then ask questions about views on domestic
policies. Were this intervention not randomized, and we just corre-
lated awareness of international law with preferences, then any num-
ber of variables might commonly cause both.
The controls afforded in laboratory experiments let research-
ers create more variation than what would exist naturally in the real
world. This is helpful for precisely some of the reasons discussed in
Part II.A (i.e., observational studies have difficulty accounting for
certain treaties being essentially universally adopted). 255 In the real
world of international law, we believe that X has an impact on Y.
But the variation in X is quite small, making it difficult, perhaps im-
possible, to detect such a relationship. By manipulating X in a hypo-
thetical scenario, we can begin to explore this relationship.
Laboratory experiments also enable clear and direct meas-
urement of subject decision-making or responses to stimuli. Ambi-
Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) (http://pless.princeton.edu/), and New
York University runs the Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS)
(http://cess.nyu.edul). Additionally, a group of social scientists at the University of
California San Diego have recently established the Laboratory on International Law and
Regulation (ILAR) (http://ilar.ucsd.edu/about/).
252. For a discussion on compensating subjects and implications that it may have on
experimental validity, see MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 259-91.
253. For a general discussion on the advantages of laboratory experiments, see
MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 225-26, 305-07.
254. For a discussion on the advantage that laboratory experiments afford for
controlling variation and the experimental environment, see Falk & Heckman, supra note
35, at 535.
255. See supra Part II.A.I.
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guity about what is being measured is minimized. Part of this comes
from the sterility of laboratory environments. We can remove as
many potential confounding stimuli as possible. Some experimenters
in American politics have even sought to replicate the consumption
environments their subjects are used to. For example, Ansolabhere
and Iyengar, who were interested in the effects of television on polit-
ical attitudes, recreated a prototypical living room replete with
couch.256 In some social science experiments, researchers have be-
gun to draw on measurement techniques used in the medical scienc-
es 257 such as galvanic skin response 258 and functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging, 259 or measuring subject-specific physical attributes,
like genetic profiles. 260 Such physiological recordings would be dif-
ficult outside of the laboratory.
The decision to use a laboratory experiment depends on the
type of stimulus/situation under investigation. As a general rule,
when greater control is necessary, laboratory experiments are neces-
sary. These needs can arise in different ways. Some studies require
extremely fine-grained measurement, both in terms of content and
timing. For example, the implicit association test (IAT) measures
prejudices and biases by comparing reaction times to different stimuli
at the millisecond level. 26 1 Greater control is also required when re-
256. STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK & POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1997).
257. For an early justification of this approach, see Albert F. Ax, Goals and Methods of
Psychophysiology, 1 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 8 (1964).
258. See, e.g., Dustin Tingley, Jooa Julia Lee & Jonathan Renshon, Physiological
Responses to Shifting Bargaining Power: Micro-Foundations of Commitment Problems in
International Politics (2012) (working paper), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/
dtingley/files/bargaininganxietyfinal.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (using skin conductance
reactivity as a measure of arousal in the automatic nervous system to test emotional
responses to changes in bargaining power). See also Claudia Civai, Corrado Corradi-Dell
Acqua, Matthias Gamer & Raffaela Rumiati, Are Irrational Reactions to Unfairness Truly
Emotionally-Driven? Dissociated Behavioral and Emotional Responses in the Ultimatum
Game Task, 114 COGNITION 89 (2010).
259. See, e.g., Dustin Tingley, Neurological Imaging as Evidence in Political Science:
A Review, Critique, and Guiding Assessment, 45 SOC. SCI. INFO. 5 (2006) (reviewing the use
of neurological imaging in political science research).
260. See, e.g., Rose McDermott, Dustin Tingley, Jonathan Cowden, Giovanni Frazzetto
& Dominic D. Johnson, Monoamine Oxidase A Gene (MAOA) Predicts Behavioral
Aggression Following Provocation, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 2118 (2009); James H.
Fowler & Christopher T. Dawes, In Defense of Genopolitics, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1
(2013); James H. Fowler & Darren Schreiber, Biology, Politics, and the Emerging Science of
Human Nature, 322 SCIENCE 912 (2008).
261. Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring
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searchers want to make sure that subjects are focused on their task
and not distracted by other events that could compromise the manipu-
lation. Decreases in focus on the experimental task can lead to de-
creases in experimental effects, and even bias estimates, if the level
of focus differs across experimental conditions.
Laboratory experiments also let researchers to allow for inter-
actions between subjects. For example, nearly all experiments test-
ing game theoretic models are implemented in the laboratory, 262
though this is changing with the advent of web-based platforms. 263
In these experiments, the crucial quantities that are controlled by the
experimenter correspond to components of game theoretic models,
including the roles/positions of subjects, the information subjects
have, the strategies available to subjects, and the payoffs for reaching
different outcomes. By carefully manipulating one or more of these
parameters, experimenters can compare predictions from formal
game theoretic models to actual human behavior.264 Experiments of
this nature could be important in testing views on international law
emphasizing strategic interaction between decision-makers. 265
While experiments with deception remain common in psy-
chology, most economic labs eschew or formally prohibit deception
on the grounds that it could contaminate future experiments that rely
on subjects not suspecting any deception. 266 There exists considera-
ble debate on this subject. 267 In his classes on experimental political
science, the author Tingley suggests avoiding deception if possible,
Individual Diferences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).
262. DOUGLAS D. DAVIS & CHARLES A. HOLT, EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (1992).
263. John J. Horton, David G. Rand & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Online Laboratory:
Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399 (2011). For
an early account of the emerging use of the Internet as a platform of laboratory experiments,
see Alison I. Piper, Conducting Social Science Laboratory Experiments on the World Wide
Web, 20 LIB. & INFO. SCI. RES. 5 (1998).
264. Andrew Schotter, Strong and Wrong: The Use of Rational Choice Theory in
Experimental Economics, 18 J. THEORETICAL POL. 498 (2006); Tingley, supra note 51;
Dustin Tingley & Barbara F. Walter, The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building:
An Experimental Approach, 65 INT'L ORG. 343 (2011).
265. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 26 (using a laboratory experiment to show how
expectations help shape how customary international law develops).
266. See DAVIS & HOLT, supra note 262, at 24 n.28.
267. Shane Bonetti, Experimental Economics and Deception, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 377
(1998); Eric Dickson, Economics Versus Psychology Experiments: Stylization, Incentives,
and Deception, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 58
(Druckman, Green, Kuklinski & Lupia, eds., 2011).
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but not letting it get in the way of interesting research questions if
one can identify a laboratory that will allow its use.26 8
Laboratory experiments face a series of challenges. 269 Per-
haps the biggest are construct and external validity, since most labor-
atory experiments involve convenience samples of college students in
highly artificial settings (though this is changing). 270 Simply put, a
laboratory setting may not aptly capture the relevant real world situa-
tion. Another challenge is that experimenters may induce bias by
creating demand effects. 271 Given the highly controlled setting, ex-
perimenters may inadvertently encourage subjects to make choices
that conform to the hypotheses under investigation: not because the
subjects actually want to make such a choice, but because they want
to conform to what the experimenter wants. Ultimately, these limita-
tions are the flip side of advantages. 272 Careful control of the exper-
imental setting helps establish causal relationships and explore rela-
tionships impossible to examine in the real world, but which are
important.
Although laboratory experiments certainly could be a viable
method of studying questions of international law, the validity chal-
lenges that laboratory experiments present may make them less popu-
lar compared to other methods. In the international law context,
much of the appeal of experimental methods is that they present a
way to rigorously test existing theories of how individuals and organ-
izations respond to international legal requirements. The further re-
moved that tests are from the actual operation of international law,
however, the less likely they are to produce evidence convincing
skeptical scholars or policymakers. Of course, such concerns should
always be balanced against the advantages of laboratory-based exper-
iments, including their often superior ability in controlling the data
generating process.
B. Survey Experiments
A survey experiment involves administering surveys to indi-
268. For an extended discussion on the ethical implications of conducting experiments
that involve deception, see MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 500-21. See also
McDermott, supra note 40, at 41.
269. See McDermott, supra note 40, at 40-41 (summarizing the challenges and
disadvantages of experimental research).
270. Id.
271. Id.at33-34.
272. Id. at 38-39.
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viduals, with various types of randomizations. 273 These can include
randomized textual prompts/frames, question wordings, response op-
tions, or other stimuli like video feeds or audio clips. 274 These ma-
nipulations let researchers explore how survey responses differ across
different settings. Additional, non-experimental, questions allow re-
searchers to have additional subject-specific covariates. 275 Survey
experiments can be delivered via professional polling firms 276 or re-
searcher-created surveys using online platforms. 277 Survey experi-
ments can utilize nationally representative samples via the use of
probability weighting or other techniques, or convenience samples
using subject recruitment platforms like Amazon's Mechanical
Turk. 278 Survey experiments are an efficient means for researchers to
273. See generally Brian J. Gaines, James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. Quirk, The Logic of
the Survey Experiment Reexamined, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 1 (2007); Martin Gilens, An Anatomy
of Survey-Based Experiments, in NAVIGATING PUBLIC OPINION: POLLS, POLICY, AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 232 (Manza et al., eds., 2002). For advice on designing
survey experiments, see Yusaku Horiuchi, Kosuke Imai & Naoko Taniguchi, Designing and
Analyzing Randomized Experiments: Application to a Japanese Election Survey Experiment,
51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 669 (2007).
274. For an example of using video clips as an experimental treatment, see Jonathan
Renshon, Jooa Julia Lee & Dustin Tingley, Physiological Arousal and Political Beliefs,
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (forthcoming 2014).
275. For example, researchers are able to ask all respondents basic biographical
questions about themselves. This may include: age, gender, ethnic background, educational
level, political ideology, partisan political affiliations, or income level. This information can
then later be used to either subset the sample to examine differences between groups, or it
can alternatively be used as covariates in a multivariate regression to control for any
remaining imbalance that might exist within the control and treated experimental groups.
276. Two examples of professional polling firms that are popular with social scientists
are Knowledge Networks (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/) and Polimetrix/YouGov
(http://research.yougov.com/). Both of these firms can provide help in creating surveys, and
then fielding them to respondents through a variety of means for a fee.
277. One example of an easy to use online platform that researchers can use to create
survey experiments is Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com/). Researchers are able to use
Qualtrics to write their own survey experiments. The platform allows users to select from a
range of question types when developing their experiments. Moreover, the platform allows
for a range of randomization options that are essential for experimental research. This
includes randomizing elements of individual questions, which questions respondents receive,
or the order in which questions are presented. After experiments have been drafted,
researchers are provided with a link that they can use to direct respondents to take the
experiments through various means of subject recruitment (e.g. Amazon's Mechanical
Turk).
278. For information on conducting experiments using Amazon's Mechanical Turk
service, see generally Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on
Amazon's Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1 (2012); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse
Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5
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understand how individuals respond to information and stimuli, often
with relatively larger sample sizes than laboratory experiments. 279
Many experiments conducted in a laboratory can also be surveys,
though their success or feasibility will depend on the experiment's
relative level of complication as well as whether interactivity be-
tween subjects, or dynamic responses from the experimenter, are re-
quired.
An example of a survey experiment on international law
comes from the discussed research by Tomz, 280 which we briefly re-
view here. In the experiment, respondents took a survey that asked a
question about support for a foreign policy of prohibiting trade with
Burma. 281 All respondents were randomly assigned various pro and
con arguments about the policy. One of these randomly assigned
pieces of information stated that the United States had signed an in-
ternational treaty prohibiting it from breaking off trade with Burma
under international law. Tomz found that individuals receiving in-
formation about international law were 17% more likely to oppose
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411 (2010).
279. There is a growing body of evidence showing that the experimental results
produced by using Amazon's Mechanical Turk are the same as other experimental methods.
See generally Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online
Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk, 20 POL.
ANALYSIS 351 (2012). For similar research evaluating the use of web-based experiments for
psychological research, see Laura Germine, Ken Nakayama, Bradley C. Duchaine,
Christopher F. Charbris, Garga Chatterjee & Jeremey B. Wilmer, Is the Web as Good as the
Lab? Comparable Performance from Web and Lab in Cognitive/Perceptual Experiments, 19
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. REV. 847 (2012). For research documenting the performance of
Mechanical Turk for economic research, see Horton et al., supra note 263 (providing a
review of Mechanical Turk for economic experiments and successfully replicating previous
laboratory experiments). Additionally, experiments conducted using Mechanical Turk have
been published, or are forthcoming, in leading political science journals. See, e.g., Gregory
A. Huber, Seth J. Hill & Gabriel S. Lenz, Sources ofBias in Retrospective Decision Making:
Experimental Evidence on Voters'Limitations in Controlling Incumbents, 106 AM. POL. SCI
REv. 720 (2012) (using Mechanical Turk to conduct experimental games to show that
participants were susceptible to biases when retroactively assessing overall incumbent
performance); Kevin Arceneaux, Cognitive Biases and the Strength of Political Arguments,
56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 271 (2012) (using Mechanical Turk to conduct an experiment testing
whether cognitive biases influence participants' views of the strength of political
arguments). See also Tomz & Weeks, supra note 20 (using Mechanical Turk to test
hypothesis on the democratic peace); Tingley & Tomz, supra note 27 (using Mechanical
Turk to conduct an experiment testing how cooperation influences participants' views on
actions to address climate change).
280. See Tomz, supra note 27; see also supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
281. Tomz, supra note 27, at 13-21.
228 [52:173
EXPERIMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
restricting trade with Burma.282 Tomz also reports a follow-up study
using British members of Parliament. 283 MP's were provided with
information about a country that may or may not be pursuing nuclear
weapons. The various bits of information were all akin to what one
would see in a standard intelligence report. In the treatment group,
the country was listed as having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) while in the control group the country had not signed
the NPT. The MP's were asked whether they thought the country
was pursuing nuclear weapons. The key finding was that MP's in the
treatment condition reported lower expectations that the country was
building weapons than those in the control group. 284 Hence the effect
of international law on its own-not factors that might change the
propensity of signing on to international law-had an effect on elite
decision-maker expectations. These expectations could, in principle,
drive subsequent behavior.
Beyond the content of what is being manipulated, survey ex-
periments come in a variety of different forms. A common form is a
framing experiment. Here, a particular issue is described in several
different ways and a respondent answers questions about the issue. 285
Another form of survey experiment is a "conjoint" survey, popular
in marketing research. 286 In this type of survey, subjects are asked to
evaluate a product, or some other quantity like an international
agreement, 287 but attributes of the product are randomized with the
subject evaluating the same quantity but under multiple different pro-
files of attributes. Reactions to different attribute profiles enable col-
lecting much more information than when individuals only evaluate
one attribute profile. Finally, survey experiments can test the mecha-
nisms hypothetically linking the experimental treatment/frame with a
respondent's stated preferences. Here, researchers ask additional
questions that measure changes in these intermediate variables. 288
282. Id. at 18.
283. Id. at 24-28.
284. Id. at 27.
285. See, e.g., Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Public Opinion in
Competitive Democracies, 101 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 637 (2007).
286. See generally Paul E. Green & Vithala R. Rao, Conjoint Measurement for
Quantifying Judgmental Data, 8 J. MARKETING REs. 355 (1971).
287. See, e.g., Michael Bechtel & Kenneth Scheve, Public Support for Global Climate
Cooperation (2012) (working paper), available at http://iicas.ucsd.edu/_files/papers/pia/
Bechtel-2012.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
288. For guidance on how to design experiments in a way that allows mediation
analysis to be conducted, see generally Kosuke Imai, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley & Teppei
Yamamoto, Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning About Causal Mechanisms
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For example, Tomz and Weeks use a survey experiment to explore
the connection between political regime type and willingness to go to
war. 289 After providing information about the potential adversary's
regime type they also ask questions about the perceived costs of the
conflict, its morality, and other mediating variables, which are hy-
pothesized to then have an impact on support for military interven-
tion.290
As discussed before, survey experiments provide a cost effec-
tive way to collect a substantial amount of data. Such experiments,
though, face many of the same problems that standard surveys face:
creating representative samples can be costly, creating panels to track
individuals over time is difficult, and subjects might give socially de-
sirable answers rather than their true opinions. 291
In addition to these general problems, survey experiments
face some specific problems. 292 If there are multiple experimental
manipulations in a survey, then there can be spillover effects when
from Experiments and Observational Studies, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 765 (2011). See also
Kosuke Imai, Dustin Tingley & Teppei Yamamoto, Experimental Designs for Identifying
Causal Mechanisms, 176 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'y 5 (2013). For examples of experiments
using these methods, see Tingley & Tomz, supra note 27; Tomz & Weeks, supra note 20.
289. Tomz & Weeks, supra note 20.
290. Id. at 19-28.
291. It is worth noting that there is an area of research concerned with survey
experiments on sensitive subjects. This line of research is specifically focused on
developing ways to survey respondents so that they are willing to reveal preferences that
they may be unwilling to share with researchers when directly asked (i.e., when there is a
stigma associated with the view). See generally Adam N. Glynn, What Can We Learn with
Statistical Truth Serum? Design and Analysis of the List Experiment, 77 PUB. OPINION Q.
159 (2013), for advice on constructing surveys that use list experiments to allow for the
research of sensitive topics. See also Graeme Blair & Kosuke Imai, Statistical Analysis of
List Experiments, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 47 (2012). For an example of research using these
methods, see Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair & Kosuke Imai, Explaining Support for Combatants
During Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan, AM. POL. SCI. REv. (forthcoming).
For resources and more information on conducting survey experiments on sensitive topics,
see Graeme Blair, Methods and Software for Sensitive Survey Questions, available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-gblair/sensitive.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
292. Many of the problems that we discuss can be at least mitigated by careful survey
design. For advice on survey design, see, for example, Josh Pasek & Jon A. Krosnick,
Optimizing Survey Questionnaire Design in Political Science, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 27 (Jan E. Leighley ed., 2010). See also
Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, How Should We Choose Survey Questions to
Measure Citizens' Policy Preferences?, (Feb. 2012) (working paper), available at
http://cwarshaw.scripts.mit.edu/papers/MeasuringPreferencesFebl42012.pdf (last visited
Jan. 23, 2013).
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treatment status in one part of the survey impacts responses to a dif-
ferent experiment. 293 Construct validity concerns can also be an is-
sue. Online surveys that ask questions about politics can only ap-
proximately simulate considerations about politics that interest the
researcher. Here, use of imbedded media, such as video clips, can be
of great help. Finally, there is the question of external validity. We
might detect relationships in our survey experiments that, were the
same things to happen in the real world, there would be no change in
behavior.294 This might be the case for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing the fact that, in a survey experiment, the respondent's attention is
(ideally) exclusively on the survey. The complexities of the real
world might not allow this, or there might be competing considera-
tions in the real world that the survey experiment has abstracted
away. 295
Survey experiments are proving to be a promising way to
study international law.29 6 Many scholars have previously theorized
that states may comply with international legal commitments when
there are no threats of external enforcement (like in the human rights
context) because the ratification of international legal agreements
gives domestic political actors a new tool. 2 9 7 One of those tools is
that public opinion may change as a result of prior legal commit-
ments. Thus, using survey experiments to test whether information
on the status of international law changes public opinion provides a
direct way to test the plausibility of important theories of internation-
al law.
C. Field Experiments
Laboratory and survey experiments typically investigate
causal relationships in environments where the participants are not
actively engaged in behavior that represents what the researcher is
studying. This can pose problems for the types of inferences that are
293. See generally John E. Transue, Daniel J. Lee & John H. Aldrich, Treatment
Spillover Effects Across Survey Experiments, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 143 (2009).
294. See generally Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Are Survey Experiments Externally
Valid?, 104 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 226 (2010).
295. See generally Paul M. Sniderman, The Logic and Design of the Survey
Experiment: An Autobiography of a Methodological Innovation, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 102 (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski & Lupia eds.,
2011).
296. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 27.
297. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 4.
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drawn from them. Field experiments minimize some of these con-
cerns by examining behavior in the setting in which it would natural-
ly take place. 2 98 We suspect that most scholars of international law
will gravitate towards field experiments because of the realism they
afford and connectedness to behavior directly relevant to internation-
al law. 299
While field experiments are done "in the field," they never-
theless attempt to retain many of the redeeming qualities of other
forms of experiments. The assignment of treatment conditions is
randomized and dependent variables are clearly defined using previ-
ously identified behavior. What can be more difficult is what is
known as compliance: 300 while one can randomize the treatment
conditions, it is sometimes difficult to ensure that the condition an
individual is placed in is the one in which they actually participate.
This might arise from conscious subterfusion or something more in-
nocuous. In these settings, researchers can leverage econometric
techniques like instrumental variable estimation 301 or report alterna-
tive quantities of interest, such as the intention to treat (ITT). 302
Field experiments have been remarkably successful in the
study of American politics, especially the study of voter turnout. 303
In recent years, there also have been field experiments that directly
speak to topics of interest to international law scholars. 304 One prom-
298. For a comprehensive guide on how to conduct field experiments, see GERBER &
GREEN, supra note 211.
299. As we have previously noted, to date there has only been one field experiment
conducted that has directly studied international law. See Findley et al., supra note 25. That
said, field experiments are becoming increasingly popular in international relations
generally, and the study of political economy and development specifically, for exactly this
reason. For a survey of how field experiments are being used to research the political
economy of development, see Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Field
Experiments and the Political Economy ofDevelopment, 12 ANN. REv. POL. SC. 367 (2009);
see also Hyde, supra note 53.
300. See generally GERBER & GREEN, supra note 211, at 131-210. See also MORTON &
WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 116.
301. See MORTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 106-08.
302. For more information on using ITT as an alternative quantity of interest, see
GERBER & GREEN, supra note 211, at 141-43.
303. See generally GERBER & GREEN, supra note 18, for a summary of experimental
research on voter turnout. For what is perhaps the most prominent individual example of a
field experiment on voter turnout, see Gerber et al., supra note 43, which conducts a large-
scale field experiment on voters in Michigan to show that social pressure can increase voter
turnout.
304. For a general overview of how field experiments can be used to study international
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inent example is the influence of international observers on election
fraud.305 In the first field experiment on democracy promotion, polit-
ical scientist Susan Hyde conducted a large-scale experiment to de-
termine how international observers influenced voting during the
2004 Indonesian presidential election. 306 Hyde worked with the
Carter Center to gain permission to randomly assign to which villag-
es their teams of election monitors would be sent. 307 These teams
then monitored the voting conduct at 147 individual polling sta-
tions.308 After the election, Hyde compared the results of randomly
monitored polling places with the overall election results, and coun-
terintuitively showed that the incumbent candidate actually did better
at polling stations that received election monitoring. 309 Hyde's ex-
periment provides concrete evidence that election monitors can
change voting patterns; that large international organizations may be
willing to work with researchers to introduce scientific experimenta-
tion into their work; and that well reasoned hypotheses (like the be-
lief that monitors would help the challenger) may not bear out after
being tested in the field.
Another example clearly engaging with international law is-
sues is the forthcoming work by Findley et al. 3 10 As previously men-
tioned, the researchers conducted a field experiment by sending
emails to 1,264 firms providing incorporation services, expressing an
interest in anonymously incorporating a shell corporation. 311 The
experiment randomly varied whether information on the status of in-
ternational law was included. Firms that responded but failed to re-
quest information on the senders' identity were in violation of inter-
national law. The experiment thus not only directly measured
relations, see Susan D. Hyde, The Future of Field Experiments in International Relations,
628 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 72 (2010).
305. Another area where field experiments have been used to study international
relations is in the study of public goods provision. See, e.g., James Habyarimana, Macartan
Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Why Does Ethnic Diversity
Undermine Public Goods Provision?, 101 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 709 (2007); James D. Fearon,
Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Can Development Aid Contribute to Social
Cohesion After Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia, 99
AM. ECON. REv. 287 (2009).
306. See Hyde, supra note 53.
307. Id. at 516-17.
308. Id. at 517.
309. Id. at 517-20.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
311. Baradaran et al., supra note 7, at 7.
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compliance, but also was a rare example of studying compliance with
international law by private actors.
From a practical standpoint, the work by Findley et al. show-
cases how to study the reaction of commercial entities via a simple
intervention: email. Similar designs that solicit a response from "re-
al" decision-makers, using email or mail, 312 offer a practical means
312. See, e.g., David E. Broockman, Black Politicians Are More Intrinsically Motivated
to Advance Blacks' Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives, 57 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 521 (2013) (for a finding that black state legislators were more likely to respond
to a request for assistance from a putatively black citizen that did not reside in their district
than white state legislators); see also Daniel M. Butler, Christopher F. Karpowitz & Jeremy
C. Pope, A Field Experiment on Legislators' Home Styles: Service Versus Policy, 74 J. POL.
474 (2012) (for a finding that legislatures are more likely to respond to letters with service
concerns than policy concerns); Gwyenth McClendon, Co-ethnicity and Democratic
Governance: A Field Experiment with South African Politicians, (2012) (working paper) (on
file with authors) (for a finding that South African politicians were more likely to respond to
requests from a fictional constituent that shares their ethnic background); Daniel M. Butler
& David E. Broockman, Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field
Experiment on State Legislators, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 463 (2011) (for evidence that legislators
are less likely to respond to putatively black constituents' letters with requests for help
voting; Daniel M. Butler & David W. Nickerson, Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect
How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment, 6 Q. J. POL. Sc. 55 (2011) (for a
finding that sending letters providing state legislators with information from a public opinion
survey on their constituents' opinions affected their voting); Daniel Butler, Monitoring
Bureaucratic Compliance: Using Field Experiments to Improve Governance, PUB. SECTOR
DIG. 41 (2010) (for a finding that high school principals that were sent letters informing
them of their obligation to provide students with information on voter registration were more
likely to do so; sending letters or emails can also be an effective strategy for performing
experiments on actors that are not officials, but still may influence policy); see, e.g., Daniel
M. Butler & Emily Schofield, Were Newspapers More Interested in Pro-Obama Letters to
the Editor in 2008? Evidence from a Field Experiment, 38 AM. POL. REs. 356 (2010) (for a
finding that letter submissions to the editor at 100 newspapers yielded a determination that
pro-McCain letters received more interest). It is worth noting that it is possible to conduct
field experiments on decision-makers without using mail or email. See, e.g., Edmund
Malesky, Paul Schuler & Anh Tran, The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment
on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly, 106 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 762
(2012) (for a finding of no evidence that increased transparency impacts delegate
performance in authoritarian Vietnam after working with a newspaper to randomly create
websites devoted to the activities of a randomly selected group of delegates). For an
example of non-experimental international law research that used email to gather data by
conducting human rights monitoring groups from around the world, see Cosette Creamer &
Beth Simmons, Transparency at Home: How Well Do Governments Share Human Rights
Information with Citizens?, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi &
Anne Peters eds., 2013). It is also worth mentioning that experimenting on public officials
raises additional ethical considerations beyond those already present in experimental
research. For a thorough treatment of this issue, see Gwyenth H. McClendon, Ethics of
Using Public Officials as Field Experiment Subjects, 3 EXPERIMENTAL POL. SCIENTIST 13
(2012).
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of engagement without the high expenses of direct face-to-face con-
tact necessary in other field experiment designs. Of course, one must
be careful in interpreting any results because in many settings there
might be no response. People might not write back, either because an
email is intercepted in a spain box or because they are alienated by
the content of the correspondence. However, even a non-response
might be thought of as a quantity of interest.313 Needless to say,
practical considerations of this sort loom large in the design, conduct,
and analysis of field experiments. No experimental methodology is a
perfect solution.
These examples show that field experiments are a promising
but under-utilized method of studying international law. * Well-
designed field experiments directly test existing theories in a way that
has the potential to generate evidence convincing to both scholars
and policymakers. This is not to say that designing and conducting
field experiments on international law is not a difficult task, but in-
stead that the potential payoff for doing so may be quite high.
With that fact in mind, when deciding between experimental
methods, researchers must consider whether they are interested in
studying mass or elite opinion and decision-making. Obviously, sur-
vey experiments present a particularly easy way to gauge mass opin-
ion. 3 14 Researchers of international law might be particularly inter-
ested in measuring mass opinion: First, there are strong theoretical
reasons to believe that compliance with international law may be
driven by changes in domestic political opinions that result from
making international commitments. 315 Second, there is research sug-
gesting that elite opinions mirror mass opinions on questions of in-
ternational affairs, and thus that mass surveys can be an excellent
313. See, e.g., Baradaran et al., supra note 7, at 45-48, for an analysis of the response
rate for emails sent to incorporation firms with request to create shell corporations as a
quantity of interest. Of course, non-response issues can also arise during survey research.
For a discussion of this issue, see Adam J. Berinsky, Survey Non-Response, in HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH 309 (Wolfgang Donsbach & Michael W. Traugott eds., 2008).
314. For more information on how to cheaply conduct survey experiments, see supra
notes 278-79.
315. See generally SIAMONS, supra note 4, at 125-55, (developing a theory of
compliance with international human rights law based on domestic politics). See also Kal
Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations, and
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 538, 547 (Thomas Risse and
Beth Simmons eds., 2002) (arguing that the relationship between international law and state
behavior may depend in part on domestic institutions); Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The
Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT'L ORG. 363 (2005).
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way to predict elite views. 3 16 If scholars wish to directly study elite
behavior, they will likely either have to conduct a survey of a sample
of elites, 317 or conduct further field experiments. As we have men-
tioned, field experiments have recently been used in exciting ways to
directly test the views and responses of elites, including public offi-
cials, 3 18 and may be a promising way forward for scholars of interna-
tional law.
CONCLUSION
Scholars of international law often devote their time to study-
ing some of the world's most important problems: How can we re-
duce indiscriminate violence against civilians? How can we promote
economic development? How should we try to combat global climate
change? Despite the fact that international legal scholars ask these
important questions, they frequently use research methods that are
incapable of answering them. Observational research methods are
frequently unable to tell us if, and how, international law changes the
behavior of states and non-state actors.
During the same period that scholars of international law have
grappled with the limitations of observational research methods, so-
cial scientists and legal researchers have increasingly conducted ex-
periments. Experiments are allowing these researchers to directly
test existing theories in ways that produce reliable causal estimates
while avoiding barriers to inference posed by the use of observational
data. International law shares many of the same issues that have
forced other disciplines to turn to experimental research methods.
But, international law faces many of these same issues to the ex-
treme, as well as problems that are unique to the field.
316. See, e.g., Gregory G. Holyk, Individual-level Predictors of Leader and Public
Support for the Use ofForce, 23 INT'L. J. PUB. OPINION REs. 214 (2011); Kerry G. Herron &
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, U.S. Perceptions of Nuclear Security in the Wake of the Cold War:
Comparing Public and Elite Belief Systems, 46 INT'L STUD. Q. 451 (2002). But see Emilie
M. Haffner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes & David G. Victor, The Cognitive Revolution and the
Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 368 (2013) (arguing that
experienced policy elites differ from inexperienced subjects in how they make decisions
because of their "sophistication," which is a learned skill that is derived from experience
and tends to be greater in elite than non-elite populations).
317. See, e.g., Tomz, supra note 27, for a survey experiment on members of the British
Parliament; see also, Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 27, for a survey on elites over trade
preferences.
318. See supra note 312.
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In this paper, we have identified five problems that are ex-
tremely salient to the study of international law and indicate the field
could particularly benefit from experimental methods. First, there is
frequently insufficient variance in the sources of international law-
treaties and customs-for observational studies. Second, the window
of time that scholars of international law can study may not have
produced enough relevant observations for large-n empirical analysis.
Third, it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the causal influ-
ence of different sources of international law using observational
methods. Fourth, data on international law outcomes is often either
incomplete or impossible to collect. Finally, international law is rife
with sources of selection bias.
Experimental research presents a solution to all of these prob-
lems, and scholars of international law should thus begin to incorpo-
rate experimental methods into their research agendas. This may re-
quire international law scholars to either seek additional
methodological training, undertake significant self-study, or partner
with social scientists. Although all of these experimental-based
methods pose their own difficulties, difficulties that are not easily
dismissed, it is our hope that the importance of the topics internation-
al law scholars study will lead them to be willing to find a way to en-
gage in experimental-based research. With the increasing array of
experimental techniques and research strategies already available, we
are optimistic. After all, although the empirical revolution in interna-
tional law has been a welcome development, if we truly hope to work
towards answers to many of the most important questions facing the
world, it is time that international law undergoes an experimental
revolution as well.
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